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Abstract 
 
This thesis determines the relationships between a range of economic variables and the increasing 
levels of internal displacement occurring over the past decade.  This thesis includes two studies, an 
examination of Colombia as the country with the highest levels of internal displacement and second, 
a global overview.  The study on Colombia examines the relationship between coca cultivation and 
eradication, violence and other economic variables that may add to Colombia’s internal displacement 
problem.  Derived from a panel data set using OLS, fixed effects models and lagged variables, the 
results show definite positive significant relationships between coca eradication, a lagged coca 
cultivation variable and homicide levels across all models, whilst suggesting that other economic 
indicators, such as labour participation rate, may also contribute to the problem.  Second, a global 
empirical study is conducted, and although the results are not as robust as in the previous analysis, 
the analysis reveals that increased levels of internally displaced persons (IDP) are correlated with 
decreased primary and secondary school attainment levels, as well as decreased economic output, 
while Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) appears to have a negative relationship with IDP 
populations as opposed to a positive link with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  The results inform 
future economic and narcotic policies within Colombia to ensure that civilians are not economically 
harmed or marginalised as a result and that the economic situation facing IDPs is taken into account. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
With the growing number of internal and international conflicts, as well as drastically low 
development in much of the developing world, the growth of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is 
becoming a major economic and social issue.  IDPs are essentially refugees; however, unlike 
refugees, they do not cross international borders, and therefore they do not qualify for humanitarian 
assistance granted under international law.  In 2011, there were 26.4 million IDPs, a figure more than 
double than the world’s refugee population (IDMC, 2012).  With such a large population, 
governments and the international community are struggling to solve the problem of IDP population 
increases and the economic effects associated with it.  Colombia, being the country with the highest 
IDP population in the world (7−11% of its population), has recorded unprecedented levels in IDP 
increases since the mid-1990s, a situation that can be linked to the country experiencing a state of 
conflict for much of the past 50 years as well as to its being the world’s primary producer of coca. 
This thesis examines the case of Colombia, specifically, to try to determine the exact economic 
factors contributing to the increasing levels of IDP’s.  Growing violence towards civilian populations 
over the past two decades has been associated with armed groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and other paramilitary 
and leftist guerrilla groups who control much of the country’s rural areas.  The control of land by 
these organisations for economic or political gain has been a driving factor pushing peasant and rural 
populations from their department of origin1, whilst also trying to disrupt opposing forces.  The rise 
of coca cultivation within Colombia has also massively contributed to this.  The reliance on coca or its 
more refined form of cocaine as a major source of income for the above mentioned armed groups 
has allowed them to grow in size and wealth and to increase their hostility towards civilian 
populations within both coca-growing regions and those lacking adequate government protection. 
Furthermore, the introduction of the widespread coca eradication policy through what was dubbed 
‘Plan Colombia’ in 1999 and its continuation in recent years has affected coca farmers and rural 
populations in two ways.  Initially suffering a loss of income, despite the implementation of state and 
foreign funded alternative development campaigns, coca farmers were scarcely able to regain their 
economic situation prior to Plan Colombia. Second, increased violence can be associated with 
eradication (Holmes et al., 2006).  As eradication caused the loss of valuable coca crops, its 
importance to armed groups has intensified. Coca-growing regions have shown increased levels of 
                                                          
1
 The department of origin refers to the state from which the IDPs originated.  Colombia contains 32 departments, 30 of which 
are on its mainland and will be examined in this study. 
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hostility and violence as the FARC and paramilitary organisations compete to control regions as the 
economic bases for pursuing their political agendas. 
Consequently, the Colombian population has been stuck in the middle of this ongoing conflict 
stemming from the narco-economy.  With the majority of rural areas severely under-developed, their 
ability to gain income from alternative sources is limited without a drastic increase in infrastructure 
and government support. In addition, the presence of armed groups and the constant threat of 
violence have caused many to flee their department of origin.  The first empirical analysis of this 
thesis determines what effects coca cultivation, eradication campaigns, lack of economic opportunity 
and violence have on the increase in Colombia’s IDP population since 2000, the year Plan Colombia 
was enacted. 
To assess similarities in IDP increases in Colombia with global trends, a second global study of 
economic factors related to displacement is conducted.  The economic consequences of being an IDP 
are severe.  The loss of capital, both physical and material, coupled with social marginalisation, 
decreases in economic output and loss of services such as education and health result in a situation 
whereby once an individual is internally displaced, their ability to regain their pre-displacement 
economic standards is extremely limited. 
The secondary empirical analysis of this study examines what relationship these factors have with 
IDPs globally to aid future governments and organisations to assess which areas are of most 
importance in helping to solve the global IDP problem. 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 looks at Colombia’s coca cultivation and eradication 
campaigns, whilst also looking at other eradication campaigns implemented within the Andean and 
Latin American regions since the 1970s.  Chapter 3 focuses on the rise of insurgent groups, their 
reliance on narcotics and their effect on the civilian population, particularly their acts of violence and 
forced displacement.  Chapter 4 conducts an empirical study using OLS and fixed effect analysis using 
a range of independent variables to assess the factor having the highest effect on Colombia’s 
increasing IDP population.  Chapter 5 assesses the global economic situation facing IDPs.  Chapter 6 
conducts an imperial analysis of economic factors effecting IDP populations using OLS and fixed 
effects models, while Chapter 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2: Colombian Coca Cultivation and Eradication 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter outlines Colombia’s emergence as the world’s leading producer of cocaine as well as 
government and international efforts to curtail this production.  From 1998 to 2011, Colombia was 
the world’s leading producer of coca leaf and cocaine (UNODC 2000, 2012).  Although Colombia has 
historically not been a coca producer, the supply chain of coca leaf and paste made its way into 
Colombia where it was further refined before being exported to American and European markets for 
consumption.  High levels of government corruption, lack of law enforcement and severe poverty 
helped the industry to flourish in the 1970s and 1980s under the command of the infamous Medellin 
and, to a lesser extent, Cali drug cartels. In the mid-1990s, these groups’ position as global cocaine 
producers was filled by militant groups, such as the FARC and AUC, a situation continuing through 
today (Felbeb-Brown, 2009).  These groups are responsible for some of the worst human rights 
violations in Colombia’s history (HRW, 2005). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the US-sponsored eradication campaigns in Peru, Bolivia and Mexico led 
to the need for a new producer of coca leaf, opium and marijuana to fund the northern hemisphere’s 
stable demand for narcotics.  Consequently, following the dissolution of the large drug cartels, during 
the 1990s, Colombia began to rapidly increase the production of coca leaf, and by 1998 it became the 
world’s leading producer of cocaine and leading grower of coca (World Bank, 2000). 
The explosion of coca cultivation within Colombia spurred the government’s need to control coca 
production, namely, large scale aerial eradication campaigns attempting to decrease cultivation 
levels.  However, the increase of aerial eradication has had inflationary effects on the price of 
cocaine within Colombia2.  Simultaneously, it has led to increased competition and hostility over the 
commodity, as armed groups such as the FARC and paramilitary groups depend on it to fund their 
own agendas (Diaz and Sanchez, 2004). 
Coca farmers have also lost a valuable form of income due to the increase in aerial eradication, 
resulting in further poverty in sectors of the community that have already been heavily impoverished 
(Dion and Russler, 2008).  Coca-growing areas are usually heavily under-developed, alternative crops 
for cultivation are limited and although government alternative development campaigns are in place, 
their ability to entirely support the 64,000 families within the coca trade is limited (Felbab-Brown 
                                                          
2
 According to the UNODC (2005, 2012) the price of a pure kilogram of cocaine in Colombia has increased from USS 1585 in 
2003 to USD 2468 in 2011, which represents a 56% increase over the  year period, the same period of time in which aerial 
eradication expanded throughout the country. 
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2005).  Some regions have been out of government control for such a long time that coca base rather 
than legal tender is the tradable currency (Aljazeera, 2012). 
This chapter discusses the abovementioned issues in the following order: eradication campaigns 
within the Americas that have led to increased coca cultivation within Colombia, Plan Colombia, 
alternative development campaigns and the goals and effect of eradication on Colombia’s coca 
production. 
 
2.1 Eradication and alternative development in the Americas 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Colombia was not a major coca cultivator; in 1987 Colombia produced 
only 11% of global coca crops (Saramiento, 1990).  Coca’s roots in Andean culture within Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Peru meant that these countries were the main cultivators.  Colombia acted as a 
narcotic producer, importing coca leaf or base for further purification into cocaine.  However, after 
eradication and alternative development campaigns in Mexico, Bolivia and Peru combined with 
increased military efforts to destroy supply channels between Andean countries and dismantle the 
Medellin and Cali cartels, Colombia began extensively growing coca in the 1990s to maintain the 
supplies necessary to meet the huge American and European demand for cocaine. 
For example, the Mexican eradication Plan Condor operating from 1973 to 1980 resulted in a decline 
in marijuana and heroin production within Mexico, as the US importation of Mexican heroin 
decreased from 6 tonnes to just 1 tonne by 1977.   By 1978, Colombia became the leading exporter 
of marijuana into the US, being responsible for up to 65%−70% of the marijuana entering the country 
and producing between 25,000−30,000 hectares of marijuana crops (Tokatalian, 2003; Bagley, 1988). 
Additionally, efforts directly aimed at breaking the supply chain between Colombia and its partners 
have often proven unsuccessful.  Similarly, the Agroyoungas eradication and alternative development 
policy in Bolivia in 1985 and the Plan Dignidad and Ley 1008 in Bolivia in 1988 had virtually no effect 
on coca cultivation in Bolivia, according to data from the US government and the Bolivian state (see 
Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: Bolivian Coca Cultivation under Agroyoungas and Plan Dignidad 
 
 
2.2 Rise of Colombian coca production and cartels 
By the late 1970s, a fleet of light aircrafts were making almost daily flights to deliver quantities of 
cocaine to the US from Colombia.  In 1976, the DEA estimated Colombian cocaine exports to the US 
to be between 14−19 metric tonnes; by 1982, this increased to over 45 metric tonnes (Bagley, 1988) 
and accounted for 10%−25% of Colombia’s exports, which were at its peak during the 1980s (Holmes 
et al., 2006).  
The cartels established complex drug networks and trade routes and were able to experiment with 
producing and trafficking cocaine.  Their ability to bribe the law meant that the business-minded, 
entrepreneurial cartels were able to produce extremely high quality and pure cocaine in comparison 
with their competition from Peru and Bolivia and control the vast majority of the world’s cocaine 
markets (Bagley, 1988). ‘Plata o Plomo’ (Money or Lead)3 was a threat which cartels used to bribe 
                                                          
3
 “Money or Lead” was a common threat used by the Medellin cartel and its sicarios (assassins) to bribe government officials.  
Outspoken politicians brave enough to speak out against individuals such as Pablo Escobar were often assassinated. One of 
the most infamous examples was the murder of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, the Minister of Justice under President Bentancur, who  
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government ministers, judges or anyone who may have been outspoken or intervened in their 
business.  Those who went against the cartels were often assassinated: between 1985 and 1987, one 
attorney general, 50 judges, a dozen journalists and 400 police and military personnel were 
murdered in Colombia under the orders of the cocaine cartels (Bagley, 1988).  The ability of cocaine 
money to bribe or fund politicians was almost part of Colombia’s political and legal framework during 
the 1980s.  Even President Ernesto Samper (1994−1998) allegedly received huge contributions from 
the Cali cartel, as Millard (1996) states, ‘President Ernesto Samper not only knew that the Cali 
cocaine cartel had donated around USD 6 million to his political campaign but also authorised and 
had an active participation collecting those resources’ (p. 539)4.  
The assassination of Pablo Escobar in 1993 and the arrest of Cali cartel’s operators the Orejuela 
Brothers in 1995 (albeit their receiving extremely light sentences) did not eradicate Colombian 
cocaine production (Reyes, 1995).  Instead, the resulting power vacuum was filled by paramilitaries 
and the FARC competing over the valuable land in which coca was grown, and Colombian production 
in fact saw a significant increase.  These groups not only took control of cocaine trafficking within 
Colombia but also supported increased cultivation in Colombia, making it the world’s leading coca 
producer in 1998 (UNODC, 2000). 
 
2.3 How trade has funded militants  
Armed organisations such as paramilitaries and the leftist guerrilla group the FARC are largely funded 
by the narcotic trade (Diaz and Sanchez, 2004).  This lucrative narcotic trade also funds government 
corruption (Millard, 1996). These factors have combined with poorly thought-out anti-narcotic 
policies and alternative development strategies to generate the extreme internal displacement 
problem, which is greater than 10% of Colombia’s population. 
The use of black markets to fund armed groups is not a new phenomenon or one that resides solely 
in Colombia.  Peceny and Durnan (2008) found that militant groups’ use of the drug trade to fund 
their own campaigns has led to increased numbers of insurgent groups, while Cornell (2005) also 
found that the presence of illegal trades such as narcotics propels the duration of internal conflict 
zones.  Specific uses of cocaine to fund and expand guerrilla activity in Peru and Colombia have been 
further researched by Felbab-Brown (2005) with specific references to The Shining Path’s expansion 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
was assassinated in 1984 on the orders of Pablo Escobar after his push to prosecute drug traffickers and extradite them to the 
US. 
4
 Links between President Samper and narcotics traffickers were so severe that his entry to the US was denied during his 
presidency (Bagley, 2001). 
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in Peru and the FARC in Colombia.  Steinitz (2002) came to the same conclusion, stating, ‘the FARC 
and the AUC have themselves become directly involved in drug trafficking. For example these 
terrorists have produced and transported drugs—usually cocaine in its various stages of 
refinement—and then provided the drugs to traffickers in exchange for money or arms’ (p. 2).  As a 
result, the huge value of the trade provides such armed organisations with the resources to fund 
their initiatives for a longer period of time.  
Huge profit margins have led militant groups to compete and fight over areas of economic growth.  
Regions with large mining projects, coca farms and industries provide added incentive for militant 
organisations to extort and engage in rent-seeking behaviour to promote their cause, whilst also 
forcibly displacing individuals from their land or terrorising communities.  As guerrilla groups have 
increased their reliance on coca as their main source of income, their need for control over coca 
growing regions has also increased (Pecaut, 2008; Valencia, 2008). 
As a result, the narcotic trade has helped equip, increase and spread the power of the FARC and 
paramilitaries throughout Colombia.   
 
2.4 Plan Colombia 2000−2005  
Plan Colombia began as a bilateral security and anti-narcotic policy between the US and Colombia, 
under the direction of Presidents Clinton and Pastrana.  The three major targets were to 1) end 
Colombia’s long armed conflict; 2) eliminate drug trafficking and 3) promote economic and social 
development. 
Due to the link between coca and armed conflict, the two major components of Plan Colombia were 
investment within Colombia’s military by the US and large scale eradication of coca plantations 
within the region. The Colombian National Planning Department estimates that between 2000 and 
2005, the US government funded USD 3.8 billion in subsidies to the Colombian government for its 
war against illegal drug production whilst the Colombian government accounted for USD 6.9 billion 
(Mejia and Restrepo, 2008). 
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2.4 Eradication in Plan Colombia 
Aerial eradication campaigns have been Colombia’s main crop eradication strategy.  The US State 
Department claims, ‘crop control is by far the most cost-effective means of cutting supply.  If we 
destroy crops or force them to remain unharvested, no drugs will enter the system’ (Dion and 
Russler, 2008, p. 403). These campaigns use light aircrafts to fumigate crops with the pesticide 
glyphosate (similar to Round-up) causing the coca plant to defoliate5.  To a lesser, though growing 
extent, manual eradication campaigns have also been used.   
The effectiveness of aerial eradication has been widely studied, with the majority of published 
studies arguing against its use. Patel (2008) argues that aerial spraying is largely ineffective.  His 
findings show only a 0.348 hectare decrease in coca cultivation for every hectare eradicated.  A key 
reason for this is adaptations in production techniques as a result of aerial spraying.  Coca cultivators 
have taken on more efficient practices; higher yields, differing strains and increased dispersion of 
crops to decrease the effect of aerial spraying are all responses to eradication programmes. This is 
supported further by Reyes (2011), whose findings indicate a 1% increase in coca production 
following eradication attempts.  Moreover, the latest UNODC Colombian Coca Cultivation Survey 
(2012) shows that despite the use of aerial coca eradication over 100,000 hectares, coca cultivation 
increased by 2% in the 2010−2011 period, findings which support those of Kraybill and Thompson 
(2003), who found that increased eradication efforts within Colombia led coca farmers to cultivate it 
more extensively.  
There are two possible reasons for this counter-intuitive result of Plan Colombia. First, increased 
eradication campaigns create incentives for coca farmers to spread crops across a larger area in a 
higher number of smaller crops to avoid detection and limit the effect of aerial eradication.  Second, 
the number of yields and density of crops appear to have risen to cope with the increased 
eradication methods used by the Colombian and US governments.  In Colombia’s Pacific region, the 
average yields of coca per hectare increased from 2.6 in 2005 to 3.8 in 2009 (UNODC, 2010). This 
region has now become the principal coca-growing region in the country (UNODC, 2012).  
Figure 2.2 shows the effect of various strategies on coca cultivation in the Andean region.  After 
increased efforts to disrupt the air bridge from Peru to Colombia between 1992 and 1994 and the 
destruction of the two cartels by 1995, coca production dramatically increased in Colombia as 
production in Bolivia and Peru significantly declined. Total coca production remained fairly stagnant 
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over the decade of 1990−2000.  However, with the implementation of Plan Colombia in 2000, 
production drastically declined in Colombia from 163,289 hectares in 2000, at its peak, to 80,350 in 
2004, at which point Bolivia and Peru saw increases in their coca cultivation, Colombian coca 
production has further declined to 68,000 hectares in 2009, its lowest point since 1996.  However, 
since the implementation of Plan Colombia, coca production has steadily increased in Peru and 
Bolivia.  In a recent report by the UN, Peru has now overtaken Colombia as the world’s largest coca 
producer (UNODC, 2012). 
 
Figure 2.2: Coca Eradication and Cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 1995−2012 
 
 
Colombia has seen a growing trend in recent years to use manual as opposed to aerial eradication on 
coca fields.  Historically in Colombia, manual eradication campaigns have been used sparsely.  In 
1994, 1,033 hectares were manually eradicated, while last year over 60,000 hectares of coca were 
manually eradicated (UNODC, 2012).    
18 
 
A major reason for the use of aerial eradication is the heightened security risk associated with 
manual eradication.  On 6 February 2010, a bomb planted in a coca field detonated, killing six police 
officers and wounding another seven.  A week after the attack, another six police officers were killed 
by the FARC snipers in the region and in the next few months, a campesino (person paid to destroy 
coca fields) was killed and two others were injured by a FARC mine wired to a coca bush.  
Furthermore, an army platoon was ambushed by the FARC, killing 12 of its members (Henderson, 
2011).  The above incidents exemplify the dangers with manual eradication in Colombia. The region’s 
various militant groups make it an extremely dangerous form of supply control, and unlike Bolivia or 
Peru, Colombia simply does not have the ability to perform widespread manual eradication due to 
the heightened security risks without an adequate level of security in place. Figure 2.3 shows the 
increase in manual eradication since 2005. Manual eradication levels’ increased by 62%, hitting a 
high point in 2008 when over 95,000 hectares were manually eradicated.       
 
Figure 2.3: Colombian Coca Eradication, 1994−2011 
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2.5 Substitution and alternative development 
Coupled with eradication and increased security, substitution and alternative development 
campaigns have also been implemented as part of Plan Colombia and the state’s attempt to curb 
coca cultivation.  Three other campaigns were implemented between 2000 and 2010, namely the 
Forest Warden Families Programme, the National Territorial Consolidation Plan and the Productive 
Projects Programme, which were jointly funded by the UN, the Colombian government and USAID.  
Their effectiveness in curbing coca cultivation and providing Colombian farmers with a credible 
alternative to coca has been questioned by numerous academics.  Youngers and Walsh (2009) state 
that the majority of the alternative development campaigns currently being employed in Colombia 
by USAID are not in the largest coca-growing regions.  As a result, they are having minimal success in 
their attempt to lure people away from coca production.   
It is critical that more importance is placed on the development of security and infrastructure in 
cultivating areas.  According to Felbab-Brown (2005), only around 10% of coca-producing families are 
able to access or benefit from alternative development strategies, without even counting a further 
800,000 people whose dire economic situations may lead them into the grip of coca production.  The 
main reason behind this is difficulties faced in growing and selling legal crops.  Without viable levels 
of infrastructure, agricultural field workers cannot grow a crop with the assurance it will bring a high 
yield, or access markets to sell it.  This situation has led narcotic and guerrilla groups to prosper as 
much as cultivators.  They replace the middle man by buying coca straight from the growers or coca 
paste from those who refine it further (Saab, Taylor 2009). The buyer and market access certainty 
coupled with the fact that coca can grow almost anywhere, makes it an attractive form of income for 
a family living below the poverty line in underdeveloped areas.   
As highlighted by Ojeda (2011) and published by UNODC (2012), only 40% of those who participated 
in alternative development campaigns received official training in new production methods and only 
28% had contact with the Colombian Institute of Rural Development (INCODER), showing a huge 
failing in the effectiveness of alternative development support.   
If alternative development campaigns are to be conducted and succeed, investment needs to 
dramatically increase. Alternative policies that result in coca farmers earning lower incomes are not 
viable solutions and are hardly a motivating factor for famers to change production. 
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2.6 Results of Plan Colombia and continuation of the policy 
Although by the end of Plan Colombia, coca cultivation had decreased and the level of homicides and 
kidnappings had drastically declined (see Figures 3.7 and 3.8), the negative environmental impacts 
such as the large amount of chemicals which are being sprayed throughout Colombia’s national parks 
and growing problem of displacement kept the Plan from being considered a complete success.  
Valette’s (2005, p. 1) assessment of the policy states that ‘while there has been measurable progress 
in Colombia’s internal security, as indicated by decreases in violence and in the eradication of drug 
crops, no effect has been seen with regard to price, purity and availability of cocaine and heroin in 
the United States’.  Coca cultivation, though less than during its height in 2000, is rising again, a trend 
also seen in Peru (UNODC, 2012). Furthermore, the ability of coca producers to adapt different 
production methods has led to an increase in crop yields, resulting in higher cocaine production per 
hectare of coca than in previous years (UNODC, 2010). As a result, the decrease in crop hectares has 
not led to a proportional decrease in cocaine output, aerial eradication has not led to a decrease in 
cultivation and alternative development projects are having limited results in many areas of the 
country (see Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4: Cocaine Production in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 1995−2010 
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Policies funded from abroad in the Andean region over the past 30 years have failed to meet 
expected goals.  As one country decreases production, another fills its place and feeds the 
international demand for narcotics.  It must be granted that the level of internal security within 
Colombia has improved and that the homicide rate has significantly fallen.  A report published by the 
U.S Committee on Foreign Relations states that, ‘while Plan Colombia’s drug reduction goals were 
not fully met, U.S. assistance has helped stabilise Colombia’s internal security by weakening the 
power of illegal armed groups’ (Biden, 2008, p. 90).   
Furthermore, according to a report published by Colombia’s National Planning Department (DNP) 
and Department of Justice and Security (DJS) in 2006, Plan Colombia has been successful in causing a 
reduction in violence.  Recovery of security includes decreases in massacres, reduction in illicit 
cultivation and progress in improving the justice system (Vellette, 2006).  The report states that the 
number of hectares planted with coca has decreased since 2000 from its peak of 163,289 hectares to 
95,750 hectares in 2005.  This has coincided with aerial fumigation dramatically increasing from 
94,153 hectares in 1999 to 138,775 hectares in 2005.  However, the UNODC has shown a 2% increase 
in coca cultivation in 2011 (UNODC, 2012). Second, the social consequences of fumigation campaigns 
have also been highlighted by Bagley (2001, p. 26), who states that fumigation goals are likely to 
displace ‘tens of thousands of coca growing peasants in FARC-dominated regions in the south, inflict 
considerable human suffering in the process…the unintended outcome may well be to strengthen 
the guerrilla movement by driving thousands of poverty-stricken peasants into its ranks’.  Second, 
the various government reports that claim Plan Colombia and the continuation of the US support has 
led to increased security in the country appears to contradict the growing number of forced IDPs 
within Colombia’s borders.  Colombia now holds the world’s highest population of IDPs (IDMC, 2012), 
the majority having been displaced by illegal paramilitary and leftist guerrilla groups (HRW, 2005). 
Critics of Plan Colombia likened the policy to US support within El Salvador decades earlier (Leo, 
Grande and Sharpe, 2000), when the US funds and training went directly to a military who practised 
widespread human rights atrocities on civilian populations suspected of helping leftist guerrilla 
groups.  Allegations of the US funds and training going towards paramilitary groups have been put 
forward, as Patras states:  
‘Plan Colombia - Despite predictable denials, US military and intelligence agencies have been active in 
promoting Colombian paramilitary forces to decimate civilian—largely peasant—supporters of the 
FARC/ELN in the villages. Dozens of suspected peasants, community activists, school teachers, and 
others are assassinated, in order to terrorize the rest of the population…Colombian military has led to 
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the displacement of over a million peasants. Paramilitary terror is part of the repertoire of US counter-
insurgency tactics designed to empty the countryside and deny the guerrillas logistical support, food 
and new recruits’. (p. 13) 
If eradication leads to a decrease in production of cocaine, then one would assume that 
organisations relying on it as a primary source of income would also face decreased strength and 
size.  A reduction in funding would lead to lower capital or equipment as well as the inability to 
sustain large numbers of labour and troops.  Second, if coca is the primary source of income for such 
organisations, what effect is coca cultivation having on the levels of displaced populations within 
Colombia or is eradication itself leading to displacement? Third, the areas cultivating the most coca 
are those also experiencing the highest level of guerrilla and paramilitary control and suffering a lack 
of development and government security. 
It is naïve to think that with such high poverty levels and a lack of government presence in the 
regional areas of Colombia, halting cultivation in one area will not lead to an increase in cultivation in 
another.   Simultaneously, vast eradication campaigns do not leave sufficient time for sustainable 
economic alternatives to establish themselves or for farmers to find viable markets, leaving severe 
poverty, which then in turn propels further cultivation of narcotics or extreme poverty. 
Chapter 3 addresses the embedded institutional features that, along with coca cultivation, help 
sustain high levels of violence in Colombia. 
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Chapter 3: Insurgent Groups, Violence and Displacement 
3.1 Introduction 
Since 1946, Colombia has been involved in the longest running civil conflict in the western world.  
Leftist guerrillas, right wing paramilitary groups, drug cartels and government forces have been in 
constant conflict throughout most of the country’s regional departments, and in recent years, 
fighting has spread into metropolitan areas and major cities.  This on-going violence and large-scale 
land acquisition have been major factors contributing to the country’s growing IDP population, as 
armed groups compete over land for economic gains and terrorise communities for political agendas. 
The disruption of the drug cartels in the mid-1990s did not end the stable supply of narcotics6.  The 
gap in the supply chain created the need for other groups to fill their role.  Particularly, militant 
groups were more than able to fill the position.  The FARC and AUC forces have served as producers, 
traffickers and security for large drug traffickers and are tied to the Mexican drug cartels7, supplying 
to the narcotic trade routes from South America to North America and Europe via Central America 
and the Caribbean (Olsen et al., 2010). The substantial value of the cocaine market accompanied by 
increases in domestic prices in recent years (UNODC, 2012) has made cocaine an incredibly valuable 
cash crop and commodity for militant organisations.  The FARC are estimated to receive between 
USD 0.5 billion and USD 2 billion from the trade (Barden, 2010), while the AUC openly admitted that 
they received 70% of their income from drug trafficking and taxes (Diaz and Sanchez, 2004).  This 
increased income from the narcotics trade has led the FARC to expand its number of fronts, increase 
its size and expand its military capital. 
Paramilitary organisations, too, have contributed to the majority of human rights violations and 
massacres in many of Colombia’s regional communities.  Competition for land due to its economic 
importance and access to trafficking routes has driven increasing conflict in rural areas and 
subsequently led to regional communities being stuck between leftist groups, paramilitaries and 
Colombian armed forces (Ibanez and Valez, 2002). 
                                                          
6
 The Medellin Cartel headed by Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa family and the Cali Cartel headed by Gilberto and Manuel 
Orejuela largely controlled the world’s cocaine market with the Medellin Cartel estimated to control 90% of the cocaine entering 
the US alone.  With the arrests of Gilberto and Manuel in 1995 and the assassination of Pablo Escobar in 1993, both cartels 
were subsequently dissolved.  Without the cartels controlling major trafficking routes and supply for North American and 
European markets, other organisations were able to fill the market, namely guerrilla organisations such as the FARC and 
paramilitary organisations such as the AUC, who were estimated to gain 70% of their profits from narcotic trafficking alone (Diaz 
and Sanchez, 2004). 
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The rent-seeking behaviour of such organisations has led them to forcibly displace villages or 
individuals off valuable or strategically located land or inflict violent human rights abuses, including 
widespread massacres.  In 2002, paramilitary forces were said to have been responsible for the 
forced displacement of more than two million Colombian civilians (Bagley, 2011), and have been 
accused of human rights atrocities, likened to those conducted during the country’s 1946−1966 ‘La 
Violencia’ internal conflict. 
This chapter outlines the origins of the three main non-government militant forces operating in 
Colombia, whilst also stating how they have become involved in the narcotics industry, and how this 
has affected the rising IDP figure and the spread of violence throughout Colombia. 
 
3.2 La Violencia, insurgent groups and the evolution from political movement to narcotics 
traffickers 
La Violencia (1946–1958) was a period of civil conflict between two opposing political classes, 
conservatives and liberals.  In 1946, a violent civil conflict lasting 12 years (1946–1958)8 erupted 
when liberal politician and presidential candidate Cr. Jorge Eliecer Gaitan Ayala was assassinated in 
Bogota9.  His murder sparked a spree of violence in Bogota known as Bogatazo, which was eventually 
controlled by the state.  However, the spree of violence, which transferred from the city to the entire 
country, erupted into an eight year politically motivated civil conflict between the conservative and 
liberal classes resulting in the death of 180,00010 Colombians and the displacement of up to two 
million people (Rold n, 2002).  Many of the 180,000 were peasants or rural families who were 
murdered by conservative militants or politically conservative civilians (Thoumi, 2003). 
Conservatives were responsible for some of the most violent acts, which in some ways were similar 
to those performed by the modern paramilitary groups.  Robin Kirk’s book ‘More terrible than death’ 
(2001) describes the ways in which massacres and murders were not only politically motivated but 
also how mutilations were performed in ways to convey political messages.  Examples of the extreme 
violence common at the time are the flower vase cut (corte de florero11) and the disembowelment of 
                                                          
8
 Although a treaty was officially signed in 1958, violence remained ongoing and the conflict is generally recognised as 
continuing until 1966, when the FARC were formally founded. 
9
 A liberal candidate, Gaitan was well known for his legal work in the Santa Marta Massacre in 1928 and later social reforms 
both as a politician, mayor of Bogota and Minister of Education promoting literacy campaigns, urban housing and health 
development after finally becoming the leader of the Colombian Liberal Party in 1947. 
10
 Some estimates are up to 300,000 deaths, see Thoumi 2003. 
11
 A method in which the victim was dismembered and the head and limbs inserted into the trunk of the body like a flower vase 
arrangement. 
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pregnant women, as well as the infamous Corbata or neck tie12  (Kirk, p. 27).  Such atrocities were 
used as a warning for liberals opposing conservative forces.  The period officially came to an end in 
1958 with creation of ‘The National Front’ a political system whereby the two parties alternated 
power and shared control of the government, although political tensions remained and violence 
continued, albeit on a lesser scale.  
The following section outlines the origins and workings of the three main militant organisations in 
Colombia: the FARC, ELN and AUC. 
 
3.3 The FARC 
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) were founded in 1966 out of the rural self-
defence groups organised by the communist party during La Violencia (Leogrande and Sharpe, 2000).  
Founded by Manual Marulanda Valez aka Tirofijo (Sure-shot), the FARC was also a political movement 
with strong roots in Marxist–Leninist methodology, with the initial aim of starting a movement to 
protect the poor peasants and lower classes who had been neglected by what they saw as the 
wealthy aristocracy within the country’s upper classes and Conservative party.    
The FARC’s origins and ideologies developed at a time when the Colombian state greatly neglected 
its regional communities and lower classes.  Their functioning as a de facto governing body in such 
areas brought positive results for many regional communities, thus establishing a legal framework, 
building schools and increasing market access and medical supplies in exchange for a tax that would 
then fund their growing ranks.  Their current political platform differs only marginally, with a focus 
on rural education, rural health care, agrarian subsidies and price guarantees (Rochlin, 2003). 
Throughout Colombia’s history with cocaine, the FARC have also played a key role working as middle 
men between coca farmers and narcotic traffickers, helping set up farm gate prices and protecting 
regions of land while taxing coca profits and allegedly trafficking the drug themselves, earning the 
title of ‘narco-guerrillas’. A report published by the US Congress in 2002 estimated the FARC revenue 
from narcotics production and distribution to be around USD 1 billion (Curtis and Karacan, 2002), 
although the FARC has denied this (Barden, 2010). 
The FARC numbers remained stagnant at around 1000 foot soldiers until the late 1970s (Petras, 
2010).  After what is known as the seventh conference of the FARC in 1982, a clear military strategy 
                                                          
12
 A method of execution common during La Violencia and used by Paramilitary troops and guerrilla organisations, whereby a 
victim’s tongue was pulled through their slit throat. 
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was put in place, including the development of new fronts, recruiting methods and urbanisation of 
the conflict (Sanches and Del Mar Palau, 2006)13.  This helped the FARC hit their highest point in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, while increased revenues from extortion, kidnappings and narcotics 
‘taxing’ aided their ability to sustain the rapidly escalating size of the armed group (Lee, 2011).  At the 
time, preceding the implementation of Plan Colombia, 65% of Colombians thought that the FARC 
would win if a full military attack on the state was declared.  Forty percent of Colombia’s territory at 
the time was under FARC control, and an estimated 18,000 troops were amongst their ranks (Sweig, 
2002).   
The development of the cocaine trade aided FARC’s growth (Felbeb-Brown, 2009).  Previously, FARC 
forces simply taxed coca profits and any wealth made during transactions among coca growers, paste 
manufacturers and drug cartels operating within their borders.  During the 1980s, FARC numbers 
grew from an estimated 1000 to 9000 by the end of the decade, hitting a high point of up to 
18,000−20,000 troops by 1999 (Petras, 2010).  According to Felbeb-Brown (2009), the number of 
soldiers in the Colombian National Army was just 20,000 in 1998, which was less than the total 
number of leftist guerrillas at the time.  This period coincided with the FARC control of coca within 
Colombia as well as a drastic expansion of coca cultivation within the country.  There is no doubt that 
the cocaine trade was the driving monetary force that enabled the FARC to rapidly expand14 (Falbab-
Brown, 2005). 
Whilst the FARC emerged in a period of civil unrest under the ideology of equality and support for 
the peasantry and lower classes, its current stance is almost contradictory with the forced 
displacement of peasant workers and acquisition of land for economic gain being conducted by the 
so-called ‘People’s Army’15.  They have transformed from a left wing political movement to one 
widely involved in the narcotics trade, leading to them being dubbed as ‘narco-guerrillas’.  The FARC 
forces are now responsible for forced displacement and violence directed towards the very peasantry 
class they were set up to defend (Bagley, 2001). Figure 3.1 shows that acts of violence toward civilian 
populations from FARC forces, peaking in 2002 This is discussed in detail below in Section 3.1. 
 
                                                          
13
 “Between 1981 and 1982, when the seventh conference of the FARC took place, military factors played a very important 
role; ... it was decided that each front would become two, until there was one front per department. Three new fronts appeared 
in the Caqueta and Meta areas and another two in Magdalena Medio. Between 1982 and 1983, another 10 fronts were added to 
the already existing 15. These operated in Vichada, northern Huila, eastern Meta, Córdoba, the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, 
the Magdalena Medio of Santander, north-eastern Cundinamarca, southern Bolivar and central Tolima.... In the 1980s the 
FARC’s growing expansion in the southern departments of Meta, Guaviare and Caqueta is explained as far as financial 
resources are concerned by the cocaine trade. The FARC also became involved in this activity in the department” (Echanda, 
1997). 
14
 This was also seen after 1986 in Peru with ‘The Shining Path’ after the Maoist Guerrilla organisation took control of the Upper 
Huallaga Valley, the largest coca producing region in Peru, allowing them to significantly expand their operations. See (Felbab-
Brown, 2005)  
15
 FARC-EP: The Armed Revolutionary Force of Colombia-People’s Army 
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Figure 3.1: FARC Human Rights Violations 2000−201116 
 
 
3.3 Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), paramilitary forces and the demobilisation process 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) is the rival insurgent group of the FARC.  Initially, 
paramilitary groups were established to protect wealthy land owners from the FARC, ELN and other 
leftist or peasant organisations who often appropriated land, livestock or crops as a tax to fund their 
own campaigns17 as well as to defend their properties against landless peasants (Machado and 
Meertens, 2010).  The inequality of land ownership within Colombia goes back to Spanish 
institutions, which divided much of Colombia’s regions between a small number of Europeans and 
some indigenous noble groups, in which African slaves and indigenous Colombians worked the lands 
(Caldo and Medrano, 2006).  Sweig (2002) even likens modern day paramilitaries to the ‘paid 
vigilantes’ who protected the vast coffee crops of these wealthy land owners. 
                                                          
16
 CINEP acts of violence include a range of variables including forced displacement, kidnappings, homicides and 
disappearances. 
17
 Decree 2298 of 1965 and Law 48 of 1968 made it legal to create civil defence groups to confront guerrillas and support the 
national army, see Holmes, Piernes, Curtin (2004). 
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While paramilitary groups operated in Colombia from the late 1970s to early 1980s18, it was not until 
the formation of the AUC in 1997, headed by Carlos Castaño Gil, that these organisations were 
formed into one official armed group.  The AUC and paramilitary groups have had extensive links to 
Colombia’s armed forces, in some cases being known as the ‘6th Division’ of the Colombian army 
(HRW, 2001).  Richani (2007) stresses the importance the Colombian military had in the formation 
and growth of paramilitary groups between 1980 and 1990 by sharing intelligence and providing 
logistical support.  Tate (2001, p. 163) states, ‘the United States is making its primary ally a corrupt 
and abusive army, members [of] which, support, train, supply and coordinate paramilitary groups in 
many areas of the country’. 
The AUC has openly admitted their involvement in the coca trade. In 2000, Castaño announced that 
the group taxed coca farmers at a rate of 40%, with an estimated 70% of their revenue coming from 
narcotics (Diaz and Sanchez, 2004).  Initially supported by the government and wealthy rural land 
owners, the AUC have participated in some of Colombia’s more bloody human rights violations. 
Human rights organisations attribute 75% of all human rights violations in Colombia to paramilitaries 
and the AUC (HRW, 2004).  Bagley (2001) states that their violations in the 1990s led directly to the 
displacement of almost two million Colombians, and in 1999, their actions were directly related to 
the deaths of 2000 Colombian civilians, whilst 50% of all forced displacement in 2001 was due to 
paramilitary forces (Ibanez and Valez, 2002).  These armed groups have been able to take control of 
vast areas, and have purposefully expelled those thought to be linked to the FARC or any leftist 
group.  The following section presents an in-depth analysis of the violence caused to Colombian 
civilians by paramilitary groups that forced many to flee their area of origin.   
In 2003, the Colombian Government implemented a demobilization process for the 37 armed groups 
comprising the AUC.  In negotiations between paramilitary group leaders and the Colombian 
government, agreements were met whereby demobilised militants would escape extradition laws to 
the US, fight drug charges and be able to keep the majority of their wealth (HRW, 2008).  More than 
30,000 militants demobilised, however, according to Human Rights Watch, the campaign suffered 
from two major flaws:  
 
‘First, the government failed to take basic steps to verify who was demobilizing. As a result, 
in at least some regions there was fraud in the demobilizations, and a portion of the groups 
remained active. Second, the government failed to take advantage of the opportunity to 
interrogate demobilizing individuals about the AUC blocs’ criminal networks and assets, 
                                                          
18
 In 1988, the Colombian government recognised 138 paramilitary groups and right-wing death squads operating within 
Colombia (Bagley, 1988).   
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which may have allowed groups to hide assets, recruit new members and continue operating 
under new guises’ (HRW, 2010, p. 24). 
 
 
By 2006, the Colombian government proclaimed that the paramilitary movement had ended.  
However, the reality of the situation is extremely different.  Many paramilitary groups have now 
reformed in an array of splinter organisations, reverting to a situation similar to that before they 
came together under the banner of the AUC (HRW, 2010).  Their involvement in the drug trade and 
hostility to civilian populations appears to be conducted in the same way.  Figure 3.2 shows human 
rights violations compiled and published by CINEP, including kidnappings, murders, massacres, forced 
displacement and threats revealing that after the ‘demobilisation’ of the AUC, violations by 
paramilitary organisations dramatically increased.  As Judice (2007) states, if the Colombian 
government is to disarm paramilitary groups successfully ‘it must also address the societal problems 
that permit illegal armed groups to thrive in Colombia’. 
 
Figure 3.2 Acts of Violence Attributed to Paramilitary and AUC Forces 
 
Note:  As the AUC were officially demobilised in 2005, data for their acts of violence ends, however, as 
can be seen a large increase in violent acts from other paramilitary organisations is shown after their 
demobilisation. 
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The AUC’s demobilisation has not ended militant organisations’ involvement in such regions, but has 
merely put an end to any centrally organised involvement.  Orders are not being sent down from a 
Carlos Castaño or other leaders such as George 40; differences in ideals and a lack of a centralised 
power have led the organisation to diversify.  The Colombian Police have found a list of principle 
successor groups, largely considered incomplete, and including  o   e   a    the Rastrojos, the 
 ai a       ci o  e ol ciona io  o  la  Antiterrorista Colombiano (ERPAC), Renacer, Nueva 
Generacion, Los del Magdalena Medio and the Machos.  Their involvement is found in 24 of the 
country’s 32 departments.  So, although the paramilitary groups known collectively as the AUC have 
‘demobilised’, the extent to which this has been enforced or the effect it has had on paramilitary 
activity remains under debate.  A report published by the UN Human Rights Council on 31 December 
2008 outlined two specific cases where these newly formed militant groups had directly led to the 
displacement of Colombian civilians: ‘On 24 May (2008), members of-‘Autodefencias Campesinas 
Neva Generacioon’ (AC-NG) allegedly forced over 200 displaced persons that had arrived at the 
village of Sanchez in Policarpa (Narino) to return to their homes.  On 15 June 2008, an estimated 100 
families were displaced from the village of San Jose La Turbia (Narino), reportedly by a group called 
‘Aguilas Negras’ (UNHCR, 2009, p. 30). 
 
 
3.4 The ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) 
Unlike the FARC, the ELN (Colombia’s second largest left wing Marxist guerrilla organisation) strongly 
pride themselves on not being involved in the coca trade in any way (Bagley, 2001).  With their 
origins dating back to 1964, and founded by Cuban trained communist guerrillas and leftist catholic 
priests, the ELN, like the FARC, aimed to increase the development of Colombia’s marginalised rural 
class and communities (Crandall, 1999). 
Estimated to have around 5000 soldiers, the ELN gains most of its funding from kidnappings, 
ransoms, bank robberies and contract security for narcotics traffickers (Nuñez, 2001; Diaz and 
Sanches, 2004). As a result, militant groups funded by the coca trade have inadvertently affected 
displacement within the country.   
If Colombia is to put an end to the climbing levels of forced displacement, the issue of paramilitary 
groups needs to be foremost addressed. The next section discusses in detail their unarguable links to 
and involvement in Colombia’s displacement problem. 
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3.5 Displacement in Colombia  
Colombia has the highest level of IDPs in the world.  According to Acción Social, a total of 
3,875,987 Colombians and 905,104 households were declared as displaced in 2011.  While this 
official number is extreme, Human Rights Watch states that there are also a number of displaced 
individuals who either do not qualify as an official IDP, have not registered or are not counted in the 
government’s official records, meaning the real figure could be as high as 5.5 million (IDMC, 2011). 
Violent and/or forced land appropriation is considered as the underlying factor of such sizeable 
forced migration of civilians (Reyes and Bejarano, 1998) as militant groups battle for strategic areas, 
try to disrupt their opponents and acquire economically valuable areas (Ibanez and Valez, 2007). The 
Colombian government estimates that peasants have lost over four million hectares of land to armed 
groups during the internal conflict (Grajales, 2011).  The coca trade has been a driving force of this in 
recent years, with guerrilla and paramilitary presence in coca growing regions intensely growing and 
the number of IDPs consistently increasing since 2000 (Holmes and Pineres, 2006).  Figure 3.3 below 
shows levels of forced displacement in Colombia since 1999.  As can be seen internal displacement 
per year hit a high point in 2002 half way through Plan Colombia.  While, the yearly increases in 
Internal Displacement have decreased, the levels are still extremity high averaging over 100,000 
people per year.  
Figure 3.3 Colombian Forced Displacement 
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Colombia’s IDP population has continued to steadily grow over the last decade.  In 2010, the FARC 
was responsible for 32% of forced displacement, up from 14.2% in the 1980s (IDMC, 2011).  A report 
published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) suggests that the likely cause of 
this is ‘the group’s increasing participation in the drug trade and the waning of its ideology as a pro-
peasant group’ (HRW, 2011).  Increased eradication efforts have driven up the price of cocaine and 
its products within Colombia while simultaneously making it scarcer, a major problem for militant 
groups dependent on it as a main source of income.  Civilians who own land in areas of strategic 
importance, for example coca growing regions or trade routes, have been forcibly displaced from 
their land or ‘disappeared’ for militant groups to gain economic and strategic control (Balve, 2011).  
Large conflict zones, either between insurgent groups or directed towards the civilian population to 
purposely cause large-scale displacement, have been documented on numerous occasions, with the 
FARC and paramilitary forces being the main protagonists.  A report published by the Commission of 
Security found that between 2005 and 2010, 60% of those displaced were directly threatened by 
illegal armed groups, with the major aggressors being the FARC, AUC, ELN, new armed groups, new 
guerrilla groups and government forces (IDMC, 2011). 
The acquisition of land mainly for narcotic production and trafficking is the driving factor for much of 
Colombia’s growing internal displacement problem.  Agribusiness provides narco-
traffickers/guerrillas/paramilitaries with a means of money laundering, whilst also giving them a 
political, economic and territorial advantage (Ballve, 2011; Reyes, 1997).  As eradication efforts 
increase across the country, certain underdeveloped areas serving as hubs for coca cultivation, such 
as the Pacific, are now seeing huge influxes of paramilitary and guerrilla forces.  Oslender (2008) 
outlines how in recent years the Pacific department of Colombia is now the centre of 
‘unprecedented’ levels of forced displacement from guerrillas, paramilitaries and armed forces as it is 
now one of Colombia’s key coca growing regions (UNODC, 2012).  The connection between the value 
of cocaine and the extreme violence that armed groups are able to execute has resulted in driving 
millions of Colombian civilians from their homes.  The next section discusses in detail about violent 
crimes perpetrated by paramilitary and guerrilla forces. 
Simultaneously, peasants living in underdeveloped areas also suffer, as a lack of other economic 
opportunities leads them to enter the narcotics trade.  Since in some cases, it is the only viable form 
of income, as Holmes et al. (2006) state, coca is usually cultivated in areas with sufficient amounts of 
labour and land but without, however, significant infrastructure or state presence to facilitate legal 
production.   
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Political ideology, acquisition of land for economic gain and accusations of conspiring with alternate 
political groups have been the underlying motivations behind violence directed towards civilian 
populations within Colombia.   
Paramilitary violence and the presence of such militant groups have had a devastating impact on 
Colombian civilians; massacres, forced displacement and ‘disappearances’ are widespread 
throughout Colombia as a result of paramilitary forces and guerrilla organisations such as the FARC 
(HRW, 2012; Bagley, 2001).  The multibillion dollar narcotics industry has been able to fund the 
aggressive agendas of the AUC paramilitary groups and leftist guerrillas, whilst also providing them 
with the funds to buy power in the government and secure their regional dominance (HRW, 2005).  A 
recent report from the IDMC states that the causes of displacement have ranged from guerrilla and 
paramilitary organisations that have displaced people for ‘economic gain, to secure land for coca 
plantation or to secure land for large projects owned by corporate groups’. The report also states 
that the large increase of the FARC’s incidences of forced displacement is largely due to the group’s 
‘increasing participation in the drug trade’.  This is also supported by Kruger and Angrist (2007), who 
found a direct relationship between areas cultivating coca and subsequent violence.  Although the 
study could not conclusively identify the channels that were increasing the levels of violence, they 
did state that the results were ‘consistent with the notion that coca supports rural insurgents and 
paramilitaries’. 
Innocent rural populations have been terrorised by both sides, although human rights violations by 
paramilitary groups far outweigh those of the FARC or ELN. Peasants thought to be sympathetic or 
working with the FARC forces have been murdered or ‘disappeared’ by the AUC forces or simply 
forced off their land for economic or strategic gain. As Sweig (2002) states, ‘anyone alleged to be a 
sympathizer of the FARC or the ELN is killed, thousands of others have been displaced’ (p. 125).  In 
2001, 50% of all forced migration within Colombia was due to paramilitaries, with guerrilla groups 
responsible for 20% and other armed groups for 22% (RRS, 2002).  The terrorising nature of the 
AUC’s massacres and land appropriation in Colombia’s rural departments almost mimic those 
apparent in La Violencia or even earlier colonial times: purposeful and planned massacres terrorising 
people for their political views.   
The AUC have participated in some of Colombia’s more bloody human rights violations; human rights 
organisations attribute paramilitaries and the AUC with 75% of all human rights violations in 
Colombia (HRW, 2004), while a report published by the Colombian mission of Jurists (2010) found 
that between January and July 2010, 67% of human rights violations could be attributed to 
paramilitary groups.  Grajales (2011) outlines a specific case in the small town of Pueblo Nuevo in the 
34 
 
municipality of Chibolo, Magdalena, one of the departments recording some of the highest levels of 
homicide and displacement in Colombia.  Paramilitary groups headed by Jorge Cuarenta19 
systematically assassinated various peasant leaders beginning on 24 October 1996 including Oberto 
Martines, a farmer; Jesus Olivio, a peasantry leader and Roberto Barrios, a teacher brutally murdered 
in the village square (Grajales, 2011).  The assassinations and political terror experienced by the 
people of Chibolo resulted in 140 families fleeing the area.  The assassinations conducted by 
paramilitary groups are far reaching and go as far as human rights activists, justices, journalists and 
presidential candidates (Holmes, 2002)20.  On 20 December 1996, members of the ACU massacred 
five people including the mayor of Riosucio in the department of Choco.  Paramilitary motivation was 
to control the area for its valuable palm agribusiness sector and to secure narcotics trafficking routes 
(Grajales, 2011), which is also being seen in the palm-growing regions of the Pacific coast (Oslander, 
2008). According to a publication in 2005 delivered by CINEP, between 1988 and 2003, 14,476 people 
seen as being opposing their political agenda were murdered by the AUC and paramilitary groups 
(CINEP, 2005).  A report published in 2010 by the Colombian Commission of Jurists states that a 
group of indigenous members of the Awa tribe, Luis Alfredo García Bisbicus, Alguacil Cel Cabildo El 
Palmar Imbi, Luciano Rafael Vargas, Oscar Efraín García Tiscus and Deyanira Nuñez21, were executed 
on 4 November 2010 in the department of Nariño.  The deaths were publicly mentioned by Vice 
President Garzon as being part of ‘a criminal project to seize their land’ and were attributed to the 
paramilitary group ‘Las Rostrojos’.  The above examples demonstrate the wide range of paramilitary 
attacks directly perpetrated on Colombian civilians to seize land and control valuable economic 
routes or strategic zones.  The fact that some have come years after the supposed ‘demobilisation’ is 
proof that paramilitary forces are still widespread in Colombia and continue to cause massacres and 
forced displacements. 
In recent years, the FARC atrocities against civilian populations have steadily increased (See figure 
3.1).  Lee (2011) outlines numerous human rights offences of the FARC; in 2000, the FARC murdered 
496 civilians with land mines and cylinder bombs; in February 2002, several bicycle bombs were 
detonated in Bogota, killing or injuring dozens of civilians; in September 2003, eight people were 
killed, among them a 2-year-old, after a bomb was exploded in a market.  Events such as these both 
                                                          
19 Born Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, leader of the northern bloc of the AUC. 
20
 ‘Due to the rebel conflict and the drug war, hundreds of bombs were detonated in Colombian cities; the Unión Patriótica, a left 
wing political party of former guerrillas, had over 3,500 members murdered or disappeared by paramilitaries; four presidential 
candidates, half of the Supreme Court justices, over 1,200 police officers, 200 journalists and judges and more than 300,000 
average Colombians have been murdered since 1985. Colombia is also a dangerous place for union organizers, journalists, and 
human rights activists. For example, in 2000, 153 leaders of trade unions were assassinated. In total, since 1986, 3,800 trade 
unionists have been killed’. (Holmes, 2002). 
21
 The victims were Luis Alfredo García Bisbicus, Luciano Rafael Vargas, Oscar Efraín García Tiscus and Deyanira Nuñez, who 
was six months pregnant at the time (CCJ, 2010). 
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rural and urban have led to the forced migration of thousands of Colombian civilians.  The FARC, 
much like the paramilitaries, has also forcibly displaced rural civilians from their land.  Armed groups’ 
dependence on coca as a means of income, especially when kidnappings have dramatically 
decreased (see figure 3.4), has led to land being an extremely valuable commodity. 
 
Figure 3.4 Colombian Victims of Kidnappings 
 
  
 
Terrorist actions by guerrilla organisations often also incur civilian casualties and affect rural 
populations.  Destruction of infrastructure is a major tactic of the ELN, especially oil pipelines.  In 
some cases, civilian populations are caught in their political agenda; such an example occurred in 
1998.  The destruction of an oil pipeline in Machuca caused the deaths of 50 civilians, with a further 
60 being injured (Nuñez, 2001). 
The above examples are not isolated incidents or rarities within Colombia.  Hundreds of examples of 
human rights violations, forced displacements, tortures, rape and disappearances have been 
reported and published by Centro de Investigación y Educatión Popular (CINEP, Centre of Research 
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and Popular Education) on their online database.  Paramilitary groups are responsible for the overall 
majority of recorded events with 7271 listed offences, followed by the FARC with 321622.  Figure 3.5 
shows the numer of massicers and victims recorded since 1999, they have decreased drastically since 
2000, however are still a major concern in much of colomiba’s regional communities. 
 
Figure 3.5 Colombian Cases and Victims of Massacres 
 
 
These numerous violent acts directed towards Colombian civilians by militant groups are the driving 
force of displacement.  While militant organisations are able to thrive off funding from the narcotics 
trade, Colombians are forced to flee their homes in fear for their lives, or in some cases are forced 
into the narcotics trade as a result of lack of any other viable economic option.  The absence of 
governmental or institutional presence in many of Colombia’s regions has provided opportunity for 
the above-listed armed groups to flourish, and although in recent years their numbers have 
                                                          
22
 See database www.nocheyniebla.org/consulta_web.php for detailed reported instances and geographical locations. 
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decreased, their presence is still profound and their violent atrocities continue to be inflicted upon 
the Colombians. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the complexities Colombia continues to face from the drug trade, paramilitary 
and guerrilla groups, and the effect these have on violence and conflict within the region. 
Colombia has shown significantly consistent levels of IDPs since 2000, with most recent reports being 
between 3.8 and 5.4 million persons (IDMC, 2012) accounting for 96% of displacement in South 
America and between 8% and 11.5% of the national population. 
The severe violence inflicted upon the civilian population in much of Colombia’s regional 
communities and the lack of government support has led to the drastic increase in IDPs in recent 
years.  The ‘demobilisation’ of the AUC did not put an end to paramilitaries or their wave of terror 
and human rights abuses, and new splinter parties can now be seen across the country acting in 
identical ways. 
As the Colombian government is currently in negotiations with the FARC and ELN over a treaty to end 
the war that has been going on for over half a century, there is no doubt that questions arise over 
the effect of this new disarmament.  The FARC want political power within Colombia and safety from 
any legal repercussions over human rights violations.  The demobilisation of the paramilitaries in 
2009 did not result in an end of right-wing insurgent groups linked to the lucrative coca trade, as 
mentioned above.  Will the dissolution of the FARC end in the same way, with the diversification and 
splintering of the leftist group?  Who will enter the coca trade in their absence?  Coca and cocaine 
entered Colombia for economic benefits, as a business.  The social issues highlighted by Judice (2007) 
need to be addressed as well as the severe regional neglect in much of Colombia’s rural 
departments.  As one group leaves the trade, another enters, a pattern seen following the 
destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the 1990s. The economic effects of a multibillion dollar 
industry will not simply disappear with the end of the FARC, nor will the human rights violations and 
victimisation of civilian populations associated with it. 
The following chapter tests the extent to which the above issues have on internal displacement 
within Colombia as well as the effect of both coca cultivation and eradication, and levels of growth or 
economic opportunity and violence within the region.  We know that coca and the narcotics trade 
are significant resources for funding guerrilla groups and paramilitary organisations, whilst these 
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groups are also principle aggressors towards civilian populations, and thus the ones causing the huge 
increase in internal displacement over the past decade. 
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Chapter 4:  Empirical Study of Colombian Displacement, Eradication, Violence and Income  
4.1 Introduction 
Colombia is a unique case within the global IDP problem.  For over half a century, militant 
organisations have been in conflict with government troops to control areas of the country.  Whilst 
leftist guerrilla groups such as the FARC still exist from that period, other paramilitary groups, such as 
the ELN, have emerged in an initial attempt to counter the leftist FARC.  Originally hired as private 
armies for wealthy land owners, these paramilitaries have openly admitted to receiving as much as 
70% of their funds from the narcotics trade (Diaz and Sanchez, 2004), and in recent years have been 
accused and charged with some of the gravest human rights violations in Colombia’s history. 
According to a report published in 2008 by Human Rights Watch, ‘paramilitary groups have ravaged 
much of Colombia for two decades… they have massacred, tortured, forcibly “disappeared”, and 
sadistically killed countless men, women, and children, wherever they have gone’(p. 8).  Guerrilla and 
paramilitary troops forcibly displace communities from land valued for its strategic position or 
economic importance, or terrorise communities they suspect of helping or operating with their 
opposition (see previous chapter).   
For farmers to sustain a sufficient income, many have had to enter the coca trade.  As a result of 
limited employment or market availability, some rural families find it impossible to grow other legal 
crops. Without roads, transport or market access other crops are a non-viable form of income—not 
to mention the lack of demand, with other areas of Colombia already producing vast amounts of 
agricultural products and virtually no opportunity for an export market (Dion and Russler, 2008).  
Coca has been a viable form of income for farmers due to the fact that drug traffickers have been 
able to overcome the logistical gaps that legal crops could not. 
It can be understood that if eradication campaigns affect crop yields, then insufficient amounts of 
income may force individuals to migrate to new areas (Bagley, 2001).  Aerial eradication, of course, 
does not solely affect the coca crop, but any plant sprayed within its path.  Coca crops have been 
planted alongside or amongst other legal forms of agriculture (UNODC, 2010).  Legal crops that are 
also sprayed by these light aircraft are often destroyed, leaving peasant workers not only without 
coca crops to yield an income but also without other legal forms of income.   
The above factors have all contributed to disrupt Colombia’s civilian population.  This chapter aims to 
test what relationship economic and social variables, coca cultivation and coca eradication have with 
internal displacement in Colombia, using two measurements of displacement published by Acción 
Social: displaced persons and displaced households, a measurement of displaced individuals from 
40 
 
their department of origin. Using an array of independent variables, including departmental 
homicide rates, total internal production, the participation rate, coca cultivation and aerial 
eradication of coca crops, the analysis highlights which economic and social variables are correlated 
with the current problem of internal displacement within Colombia’s departments. 
 
4.2 Methodology and hypothesis 
The regression analysis in this chapter determines the impact that economic climate, violence, coca 
cultivation and eradication have had on internal displacement levels.  As the previous chapter has 
outlined, all these factors have been associated with internal displacement.  By incorporating such 
variables within the models used in this section, we aim to gain some insight into the extent to which 
these factors are possibly contributing to internal displacement within Colombia and their relative 
weight.  It must be stressed that the results do not show direct causality to displacement, however, 
aim to provide a gauge of indicating what variables have a significant relationship with internal 
displacement in Colombia. 
The regression analysis uses a panel data set.  Panel data provides multiple observations of each 
individual variable in the sample over time.  It has certain advantages over pure time-series or cross-
sectional estimates, as Hsiao (2003) states, ‘panel data gives the researcher a number of advantages 
such as a large number of data points, increasing the degrees of freedom, and reducing the 
collinearity among explanatory variables, resulting in an improved efficiency of economic estimates’ 
(pg.3).  Second, it helps deal with unobserved heterogeneity (Plumper and Troeger, 2006).  
Unobserved heterogeneity refers to the inability of the model to assess or observe inferences that 
are correlated with the observed variables or entities within the model (Arellano, 2003).  This is due 
to the exclusion of variables which may be correlated or affecting the outcome of the variables 
included within the model.  For example, departments lacking government presence or security may 
also be departments in which illicit coca cultivation and armed groups flourish as well as being an 
area of aerial eradication targeting; as our model does not include a variable to account for 
government security, there may be a significant relationship between this unobserved factor and the 
variables that are included within the models23.   
The fixed effects model examines the effects within each department, e.g. how X1, X2, X2 affects Y 
within location N over time period T, similar to combining a time-series and cross-sectional 
regression in one model.  The benefit of this approach is that it compensates for the effect other 
                                                          
23
 I would like to thank my examiners for stressing the importance of this issue. 
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predictor variables may have on the dependent variable.  As a result, each entity is treated 
differently, as in this study we are looking at the effect that eradication, violence, production and 
cultivation may have on displacement. An OLS model is used to provide a general overview of the 
relationships between independent variables and the dependent variable throughout Colombia as a 
whole, whilst the use of a fixed effect model will give a more efficient overview of the variables 
within each department and restrict the effects of collinearity and time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
In these specific models, the entities will be Colombia’s departments—32 in total.  The dependent 
variables used will be forcibly displaced households and individuals; and the independent variables 
are the array of variables discussed below. 
Data for displaced persons will be taken from Acción Social, the human rights department of the 
Colombian Government.  Acción Social provides data based on gender, ethnicity and age for all 
displaced persons.  This section will use data for displaced persons from their department of origin or 
‘department expelled’.  This thesis will use the government levels published by Accion Social, even 
though according to Human Rights Watch, there are a large number of displaced people who have 
not been officially recorded (HRW, 2010), which would suggest that CINEP’s figures are closer to the 
actual IDP levels.  As a result, the real number of displaced people in Colombia is likely to be far 
greater than any of the recorded data sets available. Some estimates place it at 5.5 million people 
(HRW, 2012), far above the 3.8 million published by Acción Social. 
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Table 4.1 Colombian Total Displaced Persons by Department 
Department 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Amazonas 37 47 122 130 67 150 153 84 81 43 8
Antioquia 36997 26197 70981 90270 64851 37019 38834 39226 32391 32301 30605 24618 24575 18612
Arauca 448 882 1031 1595 6047 5122 6010 5390 9382 11737 10387 5223 3894 1377
Atlantico 90 74 393 415 477 553 636 744 894 1046 880 383 290 153
Bogota DC 17 79 50 110 231 122 235 635 784 963 1084 741 184 55
Bolivar 26566 19435 46569 51067 36443 16825 16530 21679 23552 20451 13624 5421 3130 2686
Boyaca 71 224 349 1446 1597 1267 1595 1544 1788 1971 1489 839 183 150
Caldas 217 385 1002 4884 15252 5989 6719 8917 5121 4598 3059 1240 353 114
Caqueta 114 4548 6305 11123 25825 11810 19934 16020 20415 19549 17666 11613 10230 6209
Casinare 223 492 1324 2904 3219 3075 5180 2666 1328 1481 1121 754 311 173
Cauca 318 738 6840 19827 14878 6865 5978 13162 14254 16138 20359 13287 10232 10070
Cesar 4531 4770 13142 24400 33601 24376 20407 17531 13826 13220 8559 3348 980 678
Choco 5800 5961 14825 21928 31703 9667 10036 11393 8537 11032 10126 6719 4075 5045
Cordoba 5267 10953 12333 17082 15488 4667 5117 7677 8260 9559 13947 8454 8511 5910
Cundinamarca 557 764 2118 4795 12938 13113 4505 4153 3554 4865 3859 1683 444 211
Guainia 25 53 47 130 227 175 535 502 626 705 528 411 212 147
Guavare 646 747 1663 2713 5669 6154 5102 5419 4484 4750 5592 3223 2209 1053
Huilia 427 431 1052 2732 6102 6228 5072 5712 7190 9697 9650 7754 4794 3145
Laguajira 691 1286 3964 3449 11740 6518 6160 8928 10131 6315 4279 3274 2263 634
Magdalena 3145 11403 22573 28845 36765 16219 16079 17058 18912 24284 11621 3338 1739 753
Meta 2904 3844 5714 6655 14485 10188 10058 17277 18219 14178 12147 6609 4230 2083
N,de Santander 1356 9292 5737 9854 27140 11204 9354 9579 9508 8852 7948 4448 2465 1832
Nariño 157 214 1013 8511 11369 6828 5349 10648 20087 37075 33305 26688 20966 16497
Putomayo 539 1276 10768 16618 23994 13475 9544 11086 12742 15321 13651 7651 5778 3042
Quindio 14 51 148 388 757 554 719 886 650 920 1109 720 314 46
Risaralda 265 408 1308 1938 1982 2461 2673 2170 2304 2797 1910 724 185 64
Santander 3396 2334 7320 14008 8606 4776 5337 6588 8043 9762 6890 3179 1701 832
Sucre 4720 6022 16593 21436 19968 7939 10075 9047 7145 6489 4019 1563 651 668
Tolima 1673 2638 7499 15472 20305 13142 12166 13305 18324 22797 21548 12481 7540 4431
Vaupes 210 88 221 40 163 341 595 534 335 368 455 238 141 78
Source: www.accionsocial.gov.co, red de banco de datos 
Departments such as Antioquia, Bolivar, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Magdalena and Cauca have 
historically suffered the highest levels of internal displacement. Not surprisingly, between 2002−2003 
and 2006−2007, increased conflict between government and militant groups occurred in the 
departments of Meta, Caqueta, Arauca, Nariño, Putumayo, Norte de Santander, Antioquia and 
Tolima (Derechos Humanos, 1998–2011), which also coincided with spikes in internal displacement 
according to our data from Accion Social. In addition, the national homicide rate dramatically 
increased around 2002−2003 (UN databank).  This timeframe coincides with coca eradication 
drastically increasing in 2003 and again in 2007 (See Figure 2.2).  According to coca eradication data 
published by the UNODC (2012), many areas experiencing increased displacement such as Antioquia 
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were areas also experiencing high levels of coca eradication.  Increases in conflict, violence and 
eradication can be seen, which is why this thesis hypothesised the mixed link between coca and 
violence leading to forced displacement.  
Coca eradication and cultivation data comes from the UNODC, who regularly publishes data on coca 
cultivation and eradication in the Andean region of South America.  The data used in this study has 
been taken from the UNODC’s Colombian Coca Survey, published annually since 2000, based on data 
collected using satellite imagery from their integrated monitoring system covering 1,142,000 km2 of 
Colombia’s territory. These are posted at the national and departmental levels.  This study uses 
departmental level statistics.   
As violence is also a contributing factor to displacement, a value for homicides will be included in the 
empirical analysis, as well as the number of massacres.  The Colombian Government Department 
DANE (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica) and the National Police provides 
departmental homicide statistics.   
Poverty is also a contributing factor to displacement.  As data on poverty is missing for the years 
2005−2007 as published by DANE, employment and production indicators will be used as proxy 
variables, specifically the participation rate, other agricultural production24 and total internal 
production, which are measured in millions of millions of Colombian pesos25.  Official employment 
levels do not reflect actual levels of employment in many regions, as many farmers are not registered 
with the government, especially those working on coca crops.  Official figures do, however, provide 
some insight into the economic situation of each department and as a result, offer some insight into 
the possible incomes or poverty levels within each department.  DANE’s published unemployment 
statistics and departmental production statistics will be the data used within this study’s models. 
 
4.3 Relationships and testing 
The testing will cover a period from 2001 to 2010.  A range of tests will be implemented to reveal the 
role each variable plays; an OLS, fixed effects, fixed effects including time dummies and the use of 
time lags on variables such as aerial eradication and the participation rate will be used to ensure that 
variable causality is addressed in the correct direction.   
                                                          
24
 Other agricultural production excludes products such as coffee and livestock, which are generally 
grown or raised in particular areas within Colombia.  As including this may result in geographical bias, 
other agricultural production is used instead to reduce the risk of endogeinety occurring within the 
statistical models used in this chapter.  
25
 Both are measured in current prices. 
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 The initial OLS equation is 
                                                      
    = the dependant variable (DV) 
    = independent variables (IV) 
   = coefficient for the independent variable 
               
While the fixed effects equation is determined by 
                       
   = (I = 1..n) unknown intercept of each entity 
    = the dependant variable (DV) 
    = independent variables (IV) 
   = coefficient for the independent variable 
    = error term 
With the implementation of a time lag 
 
                             (4.2) 
   = (I =1..n) unknown intercept of each entity 
    = the dependant variable (DV) 
    = independent variables (IV) 
      = independent variables (IV) in time period t-1 
   = coefficient for the independent variable 
    = error term 
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Our fixed effect equation including a year dummy variable becomes 
                                                     
    = the dependant variable (DV) 
      = the independent variables (IV) 
   = Coefficient of the independent variables 
    = error term 
   = the entity n. 
   = coefficient for the binary regressors 
   = time as a binary variable  
   is the coefficient of the binary time repressors  
With the implementation of a time lag 
                                                                   
    = the dependant variable (DV) 
      = the independent variables (IV) 
        = the independent variables (IV) in time period t -1 
   = Coefficient of the independent variables 
    = error term 
   = the entity n. 
   = coefficient for the binary regressors 
   = time as a binary variable  
   is the coefficient of the binary time regressors  
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4.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics are based on the departmental level within Colombia.  As 
seen, aerial eradication on average is more than double that of coca cultivation.  Whilst this should 
suggest that aerial eradication is vastly outstripping coca cultivation, this statistic also included 
certain areas, which were eradicated on more than one occasion and as a result, the mean can 
mislead the reader if this is not taken into consideration as coca cultivation actually increased by 2% 
in 2011 (UNODC, 2012). 
The results of forcibly displaced individuals and households appear to be consistent with the idea 
that households represent groups of 3−4 individuals, with 7728 individual IDPs and 2200 households 
as mean estimators. 
Large deviation between the minimum value and maximum value for the economic variables used in 
the models are a good reflection of the differing economic prospects within Colombia’s 32 
departments, for example total internal production showing a minimum value of 335 million of 
millions Colombian pesos compared to the maximum value of 65809 million of millions of Colombian 
pesos. 
 
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Homicides 133 738.35 876.2 113 6926
Other Agricultural 133 602.37 545.69 21 2331
Production (Mills of Mills of Col Pesos)
Total Internal Production 133 9390.11 12172.38 335 65809
Production (Mills of Mills of Col Pesos)
Expelled 133 12588.8 10456.15 183 64851
Persons
Expelled 143 3686.93 3824.91 63 21393
Households
Coca 133 3182.22 3739.05 5 18740
Cultivation (ha)
Aerial Eradication (ha) 94 6198.95 6690.02 5 27058
Participation 133 59.44 5.62 48.1 70.9
Rate (%)
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4.4 Results 
Table 4.3 presents models using expelled persons as a dependant variable with the range of 
independent variables including aerial eradication, other agricultural production, total internal 
production, the participation rate and a dummy variable for plan Colombia.  Models 1 to 3 include 
OLS, fixed effects and a fixed effects model with a year dummy variable.  Models four to six include 
the same set of models however including lagged variables for the Participation Rate and Aerial 
Eradication. 
Total Homicides show consistently positive and significant correlations with Expelled Persons 
(7.36***, 5.65***, 4.54***, 6.34***, 3.92, 5.4**)].  Other agricultural production and total internal 
production show a mostly negative significant relationship (-7.14***, -2.11, 0.16, 0.30***, -0.45*** -
0.30**) and (0.24***, -0.38*, -0.33**, -7.68***, -3.73*, -1.01) respectively.  The participation rate 
also shows a negative relationship (-63.8, -406***-201).  Aerial eradication and lagged aerial 
eradication show positive significant relationships with expelled Persons. (0.26***, 0.25***, 0.15) 
and (0.15**, 0.15**, 0.14***). 
Table 4.3 : OLS, Fixed Effect and dummy year models using aerial eradication and Lagged variables
Expelled Persons OLS Fixed Effects FE i.year OLS Fixed Effects FE i.year
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Independent Variables
Total Homicides 7.36*** 5.65*** 4.54*** 6.34*** 3.92 5.40**
[7.11] [6.38] [3.33] [4.32] [1.09] [2.39]
Other Agricultural -7.14*** -2.11 0.16 0.30*** -0.45*** -0.30**
Production [-3.56] [-1.38] [0.24] [3.45] [-3.68] [-2.54]
Total Internal 0.24*** -0.38* -0.33** -7.68*** -3.73* -1.01
Production [2.90] [-1.81] [-2.19] [-4.44] [-1.87] [-0.81]
Participation Rate -63.8 -406*** -201
[-0.47] [-3.04] [-0.75]
Aerial Eradication 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.15
[3.52] [7.24] [1.73]
Plan Colombia Dummy 2,264 1,834 2,391 -397 -1,436
Years 2001-2005 [1.48] [1.55] [1.59] [-0.31] [-0.55]
Lag Aerial Eradication 0.15** 0.15** 0.14***
[2.26] [2.58] [3.68]
Lag Participation Rate -7.39 10.9 -120
[-0.057] [0.060] [-0.53]
Constant 10,565 8,173 15,095 19,600
[1.33] [4.16] [1.32] [1.08] [1.47] [1.56]
Observations 98 98 98 94 94 94
R
2 0.65 0.51 0.67 0.59 0.33 0.67
t-statistics in brackets
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
No Lagged Variables Laged Aerial Eradication and Participation rate
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Table 4.4 contains the same analysis as table 4.3 however, replaces Coca Eradication with Coca 
Cultivation.  They are separated into differing analysis due to co-linearity which may affect the 
outcomes of the model if included in the same analysis. 
Similarly to Table 4.3 total homicides show consistently positive significant correlations with expelled 
persons (6.88***, 5.13***, 4.35***, 6.58***, 4.69***, 4.34***).  As well the economic variables of 
other agricultural production, Total Internal Production and the participation rate also continue the 
same patterns as in Table 4.2 (-9.16***, -2.48, 0.51, -8.57***, -3.54** 0) (0.31***, -0.43*, -0.29, 
0.30***, -0.44**, -0.2) and (-164, -338***, -106) respectively. 
Table 4.4: OLS, Fixed Effect and dummy year models using coca cultivation and Lagged variables
Expelled Persons OLS Fixed Effects FE i.year OLS Fixed Effects FE i.year
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Independent Variables
Plan Colombia Dummy Years 2001-20053,988*** 2,001 -1,738 4,499*** 827 8,251**
[2.75] [1.73] [-0.78] [3.04] [0.63] [2.26]
Total Homicides 6.88*** 5.13*** 4.35*** 6.58*** 4.69*** 4.34***
[6.42] [5.15] [3.44] [6.37] [5.54] [4.04]
Other Agricultural Production -9.16*** -2.48 0.51 -8.57*** -3.54** 0
[-5.06] [-1.67] [0.36] [-4.94] [-2.38] [-0.35]
Total Internal Production 0.31*** -0.43* -0.29 0.30*** -0.44** -0.2
[3.58] [-1.89] [-1.45] [3.62] [-2.92] [-1.20]
Participation Rate -164 -338*** -106
[-1.28] [-3.38] [-0.53]
Coca Cultivation 0.38** 0.24 0.14
[2.07] [0.99] [0.85]
[-3.23]
Lag Coca Cultivation 0.36** 0.42*** 0.27**
[2.06] [3.14] [2.14]
Lag  Participation Rate -154 52.3 -24.7
[-1.17] [0.26] [-0.11]
Constant 16,876** 15,861** 10,427 6,730
[2.36] [2.17] [0.82] [0.49]
Observations 133 133 133 127 127 127
R
2 0.54 0.4 0.64 0.56 0.4 0.68
t-statistics in brackets
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
No Lagged Variables Lagged  P artic ipa tio n Rate  and Co ca  Cultiva tio n
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Table 4.5 uses the same independent variables as Table 4.3 (using coca eradication), however in the 
below two tables the dependent variable of Expelled Persons is changed to Expelled Households 
another measurement of the level of internal displacement in Colombia. 
Again total homicides show consistent positive significant correlations (1.67***, 1.35***, 1.15***, 
2.26***, 1.05, 1.47***), as does Aerial Eradication (0.061***, 0.053***, 0.036*) as well as when it is 
lagged by (t-1) (0.031*, 0.032**, 0.032***).  The economic variables although less significant than in 
the previous two tables also convey a negative relationship between economic growth and internal 
displacement, with Other Agricultural Production (-1.61***, 0.29, 0.1, 0.068***, 0.077***, -0.055**), 
total internal production (0.066***, -0.061, -0.059*, -2.21***, -0.71, -0.23) and the Participation Rate 
(-29.7, -106***, -54.9) showing mostly negative, significant relationships. 
Table 4.5: OLS, Fixed Effect and dummy year models using aerial eradication and Lagged variables
Expelled Households OLS Fixed Effects FE i.year OLS Fixed Effects FE i.year
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Independent Variables
Plan Colombia Dummy 170 147 605 -216 -296 -940
Years 2000-2005 [0.51] [0.56] [0.39] [-0.54] [-0.94] [-1.60]
Homicides 1.67*** 1.35*** 1.15*** 2.26*** 1.05 1.47***
[7.59] [7.63] [4.18] [6.12] [1.60] [3.26]
Other Agricultural -1.61*** -0.29 0.1 0.068*** -0.077*** -0.055**
Production [-3.72] [-0.82] [0.65] [2.90] [-3.08] [-2.71]
Total Internal 0.066*** -0.061 -0.059* -2.21*** -0.71 -0.23
Production [3.62] [-1.46] [-1.96] [-4.78] [-1.52] [-0.83]
Participation Rate -29.7 -106*** -54.9
[-1.00] [-3.34] [-0.88]
Aerial Eradication 0.061*** 0.053*** 0.036*
[3.83] [6.78] [1.94]
Lag 0.031* 0.032** 0.032***
Aerial Eradication [1.72] [2.37] [3.60]
Lag Participation 4.98 -20.1 -32.7
 Rate [0.14] [-0.49] [-0.57]
Constant 3,533** 1,731
[2.05] [0.84]
Observations 99 99 99 95 95 95
R
2 0.69 0.49 0.63 0.63 0.26 0.58
t-statistics in brackets
No Lagged Variables Laged Aerial Eradication and Participation
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Table 4.6 also uses expelled households as a dependent variable with coca cultivation as an 
independent variable (as in Table 4.4).  Again the results are less significant than in Table 4.4 using 
expelled people as a dependent variable, however, the results do show similar relationships. 
Total homicides show positive correlations with expelled persons (2.26***, 0.85*, 0.64, 2.19***, 
0.68, 0.56)  As well the economic variables of other agricultural production, total internal production 
and the participation rate also continue the same patterns as in Table 4.3 (-3.06***,-0.85, 0.1, ) and -
2.74, -99.4***, -32.7, 0.11***, -0.087**, -0.036) respectively.  Coca cultivation shows a positive 
relationship, however, does not show significant results, only the fixed effect model when it is used 
as a lagged variable does it show a positive significance with Internally displaced households(0.035, 
0.076, 0.032, 0.017, 0.078*, 0.034). 
 
Table 4.6: OLS, Fixed Effect and dummy year models using coca cultivation and Lagged variables
Expelled Households OLS Fixed Effects FE i.year OLS Fixed EffectsFE i.year
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Plan Colombia Dummy -43 -133 -1,089 -53.4 -516 1,906*
Years 2001-2005 [-0.091] [-0.26] [-1.21] [-0.10] [-0.76] [2.00]
Homicides 2.26*** 0.85* 0.64 2.19*** 0.68 0.56
[7.80] [1.80] [1.23] [7.31] [1.26] [1.02]
Other Agricultural -3.06*** -0.85 0.1 -2.96*** -1.05 -0.1
Production [-5.44] [-1.38] [0.26] [-5.13] [-1.61] [-0.26]
Total Internal 0.11*** -0.068* -0.034 0.11*** -0.087** -0.036
Production [4.00] [-2.01] [-0.85] [3.90] [-2.63] [-0.95]
Participation Rate -2.74 -99.4*** -32.7
[-0.066] [-3.53] [-0.51]
Coca Cultivation 0.035 0.076 0.032
[0.59] [1.37] [0.68]
Lag 0.017 0.078* 0.034
Coca Cultivation [0.29] [2.03] [0.57]
Lag 22.2 18.3 28.6
Participation Rate [0.49] [0.35] [0.34]
Constant 2,363 877 3,598 485
[1.01] [0.35] [1.27] [0.10]
Observations 143 143 143 137 137 137
R
2 0.61 0.13 0.26 0.61 0.1 0.26
t-statistics in brackets
*** p<  0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
No Lagged Variables Lagged  Participation and coca cultivation
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The above four tables show strong significant relationships between aerial coca eradication and 
levels of internal displacement.  This is conveyed through all models including aerial coca eradication 
as an independent variable, as well as when areal eradication is lagged.  While it must be said that 
the results to not show direct causation, the consistent results do suggest that there is a significant 
relationship between the two variables. The results seem plausible, a one hectare increase of aerial 
eradication is correlated with an increase in internal displacement by 0.05-0.26 people according to 
our results.  This remains the case when a time lag of one year is included.  All six models using aerial 
eradication as a lagged variable show significant positive correlations, which supports results found 
by Holmes et al. (2006) of a strong link between aerial eradication and guerrilla violence, which is 
often directed at civilians. Dion and Russler (2007) also found a positive relationship between aerial 
eradication and internal displacement.  The income effect of increased eradication may be one 
possible explanation for this relationship, as coca is generally cultivated in areas lacking development 
and market access; as eradication increases, the availability of a cash crop drastically diminishes, 
leading individuals or family groups to flee their area of origin due to a lack of economic activity.  This 
theoretically also supports the strong correlation with the lagged coca eradication variable, as if this 
were the case one would expect somewhat of a time lag before individuals left their area of origin. 
The relationships between the participation rate, total internal production and other agricultural 
production suggest that there is a link between production or economic activity and displacement, 
especially considering that the fixed effects model is more robust and efficient than the OLS model 
used.  As there may be an endogenous relationship between the participation rate and displacement 
levels (i.e. as people leave a department, the pool of workers decreases, causing a natural decrease 
in the participation rate), a time lag was also used to counter this issue26.  Our results on the lagged 
variable are mostly positive; however, as they lack significance, there is no strong evidence to 
suggest an endogenous relationship between the two.   
While it must be stressed that this does not show causality, it does suggest that there is a 
relationship between economic production and displacement according to the results of the models 
used in this chapter.  This may be due to a range of factors.  For example, a department having a low 
level of agricultural productivity or economic activity may lead to individuals entering the coca trade 
as a lack of economic activity pushed citizens into black market activity due to dire circumstances.  It 
                                                          
26
 One issue with this variable is if individuals leave an area, the participation rate can possibly 
increase as the total pool of individuals decreases.  Some of those who are displaced are not counted 
as an individual who would be involved within the participation rate; one who is either working or 
actively seeking work.  As a result as this group of individuals leave a department of origin, it 
decreases the pool of individuals resulting in an increase of the participation rate.  This being said, it is 
not always the case and as the majority of the results for this variable lack any significance, it is 
difficult to form any sound conclusions. 
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may also be pushing individuals into guerrilla organisations; although organisations such as the FARC 
do not pay large wages for their forces, it may be an option for an individual with no other economic 
prospects.  As a result, a lack of economic opportunity or activity may be both increasing coca 
cultivation and guerrilla activity, two factors that have contributed to violence within Colombia and 
increased hostility towards citizens and as a result, leading to increased levels of displacement. 
Coca cultivation shows positive results, albeit not all significant. However, when the variable is 
lagged, constant significant correlations are shown across all models using displaced persons as a 
dependant variable [Table 4.3 (0.036** 0.42*** 0.27**)] and Table 4.5(0.017, 0.078*, 0.034).  This 
result suggests that a relationship exists between increased levels of coca cultivation and of internal 
displacement.  One possible explanation for this is the idea that militant groups forcibly displace 
people from their land for strategic narcotic growing activities to increase revenue, as stated by 
Kruger and Angrist (2007), i.e. individuals are forced off their land for paramilitary groups to use the 
area for coca cultivation.  While the models used cannot show this causation, the correlation 
between the variables supports this argument. 
The variable with the most consistent positive significant correlations with both individual and 
household displacement is total homicides.  Total homicides show positive correlations in all models, 
with the majority at a 95% or 99% significance level.  This is in consistent with the hypothesis and 
model, as the major contributor to forced displacement is violence, as individuals or family groups 
flee their area of origin in fear of their lives due to the increased threats from militant organisations.  
As mentioned previously, this does not mean that an increase of homicides leads to or causes an 
increase in displacements. However, the strong and consistent results suggest that homicides are 
strongly related with internal displacement— often individuals murdered by paramilitary or leftist 
guerrilla groups are community leaders or the heads of the family leading to other individuals fleeing 
in fear of their own livelihood.   
The link between the official time period of Plan Colombia and internal displacement figures does not 
appear to have a correlation, with significant relationships only appearing in Table 4.4.  This may be 
due to the fact that the policy has continued unofficially until the present day despite its official 
ending in 2005. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
While the previous chapter discussed issues linking paramilitary groups, the coca trade and narcotics 
policy with levels of internal displacement, our empirical results also suggest that significant 
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relationships between these variables exist.  Increased levels of aerial coca eradication are highly 
correlated with those of internal displacement; the results only state correlation, not causality.  
However, theoretically the relationship shown in the models may be due to increased hostility from 
paramilitary groups or guerrilla organisations such as the FARC (Holmes et al., 2006), or the 
possibility of an income effect whereby coca farmers are forced to flee their land due to 
unsustainable livelihoods without an income derived from coca or can be attributed to another 
exogenous non-observed variable are not included in this model. However, a significant positive 
relationship between the two is certainly indicated by the models used in this chapter.  A strong link 
between coca cultivation and displacement was also shown by the regression results, and the results 
were even more significant with a lagged (t - 1) time period.  This adds to the findings of Kruger and 
Angrist (2007) that one possible explanation for this relationship is paramilitary groups forcing 
groups from their land to secure for themselves viable economic areas for coca production.   
Aerial eradication has proven to be an ineffective method of supply control, with its failings 
compounded by the results of the tests used in this thesis and others showing a positive correlation 
between increased levels of internal displacement and increased coca eradication.  The links 
between coca cultivation, violence and aerial eradication also show the need for possible increases in 
security to support Colombian communities who are being terrorised by guerrilla organisations and 
paramilitary groups. 
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Chapter 5: Internal Displacement: Global Causes and Trends 
 
5.1 Introduction 
At the end of 2011, 26.4 million people were officially declared internally displaced according to 
IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre).  Widespread violence, social discrimination and 
weak economic prospects have limited the possibility of recovery and economic futures for those 
displaced.  Countries engulfed in political instability, low levels of development and high levels of 
poverty are unable to satisfy the needs of those displaced, leading to the social and economic 
consequences of being labelled as long-term displacees, some for a second or third occasion. 
Internal conflict and war from the Americas, Africa and the Middle East to Asia and Europe have 
resulted in the most devastating effects.  Motivations for such conflicts have varied depending on the 
region; political uprisings in Africa and the Middle East have recently caused the greatest amounts of 
internal displacement, whilst religious and ethnic guerrilla groups within East and South East Asia 
over the last 30 years have led to the displacement of millions. Parts of Colombia and India have seen 
families and villages being forcibly displaced within regions of economic opportunity, due to conflicts 
over mining resources and land (Downing, 2002)). Cartel organisations in Mexico compete for 
valuable trade routes and regions in the country’s north, making thousands flee from their homes 
due to escalating violence (Shirk, 2011).  Whatever the motivation behind such violence, one 
consistent result is people having to flee their region of origin as a result, with many unable to return 
for many years. 
The long term effects of displacement are exemplified by the Guatemalan civil conflict, Mexican 
Zapatista revolt and the Bangladesh armed conflict.  The Guatemalan civil war, which ended in 1996, 
resulted in the country still experiencing an undisclosed number of IDPs (IDMC, 2012). In Mexico, 20 
years after the Zapata revolt, 20,000 people are still displaced as a result of lack of development and 
extreme poverty (IDMC, 2012). Similar examples can be seen in Bangladesh, where 20 years of 
armed conflict have resulted in the displacement of 600,000 people (IDMC, 2012).   
Often the government either cannot or does not take action to help support IDPs who are often left 
in shanty towns with no access to education, health care or electricity.  Once conflict zones have 
returned to peace, IDPs often find it hard to secure personnel documentation and as a result, find it 
extremely difficult to access public services such as government assistance and pensions, whilst 
ethnic discrimination often also limits their access to housing, jobs, education and healthcare; this 
has been seen in parts of eastern Europe such as Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia and Turkey (IDMC, 2011). 
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The destruction of property as well as the use of land mines has made it impossible for many rural 
workers to return to their area of origin, while their agricultural skills are often void in their new 
areas of asylum. In Afghanistan, up to 90% of urban displaced have rural origins (IDMC, April 2012). 
The length of displacement and sometimes second or third occasions of displacement are also due to 
significant economic factors.  The destruction of infrastructure, capital flight, racial marginalisation, 
lack of access to public services and unemployment result in IDPs’ future economic prospects being 
severely hampered, and their ability to return or form new credible living standards in their area of 
asylum are also extremely limited. 
This chapter provides a brief regional outline of areas of displacement while drawing on common 
economic factors within each area as well as the social and economic consequences of those living as 
IDPs. 
 
5.2 Who are the displaced? Guiding principles and internal and international responsibility 
According to the guiding principles on Internal Displacement developed in 1998, IDPs are 
‘Persons or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places 
of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, 
situations of generalised violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and 
who have not crossed an internally recognised state border’.  
They can be viewed as internal refugees27.  IDPs do not qualify for the same protectionist system as a 
refugee as they do not cross an international border.  As a result, the guiding principles of 
displacement were created to form a guide for their protection.  These are a set of non-binding 
norms that aim to provide protection guidelines to IDPs based on refugee and human rights laws 
(Ataya and Yukserker, 2006). Unfortunately, in a majority of cases, IDPs do not receive the adequate 
level of support they need from their own governments.  Second, access by the international 
community to areas of concern is often limited or restricted by local governments who sometimes 
see them as an internal problem, not one for international concern or involvement (Cohen, 2010).  
According to the principles, a failure at the national level to assert responsibility for the displaced, 
whether due to a government being ‘unable or unwilling’, means that they must grant international 
humanitarian organisations access to the internally displaced. 
                                                          
27
 The guiding principles of displacement is a document developed by the United Nations to officially recognise IDPs as well as 
legal obligation of nations and the international community to aid the welfare of IDPs. 
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As Deng (2001) states, the economic problems of displacement are compounded by ineffective 
governments and their resultant inability to control assistance from the international community, 
which is sometimes the only source of aid. However, various obstacles at the local level can 
sometimes impede aid reaching the needy population.  The ability of the international community 
and humanitarian organisations to offer credible access to aid in some cases can be limited.  As 
Cohen (2010) also states, some governments find the international community’s involvement in what 
they view as an internal problem to be intrusive, even though in many cases governments and 
government organisations fail to provide the adequate level of protection or aid to IDPs within their 
borders.   
 
Regions within Somalia such as Puntland and Somaliland have sometimes taken hostile attitudes 
towards displaced populations (Lindsay and Catrina, 2011).  Often, the majority of the 30 guiding 
principles of displacement are not met.  Principle 3 states, ‘national authorities have the primary 
duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance’. However, this is not 
always followed. Principle 25 states, ‘international humanitarian organisations and other appropriate 
actors have the right to offer their services… Such an offer shall not be regarded as unfriendly or an 
interference’. It is clear that as these are guideline principles and not laws, adherence by some 
governments falls below the standard that is expected and outlined by the UN. 
 
IDPs lack the international human rights laws that apply to refugees and are often too poor to 
migrate over international borders (IDMC, 16 April 2012 Afghan overview).  Had they crossed a 
border, they would have the UNHCR’s international protection system to aid them; however, as an 
internal problem, no international system has been established.  Kofi Annan, the former UN Sectary 
General, describes the problem as ‘an unprecedented challenge for the international community to 
find ways to respond to what is essentially an internal crisis’ (Annan, Cohen and Deng, 1998). The 
dramatic increase in IDPs in recent years has increased awareness of the problem.  Currently, as 
refugee populations begin to decrease, IDP population are on the rise, as internal government’s 
struggle to meet the requirements to cope with these dramatic increases in internal displacement or 
simply do not provide the required support.   
Many IDPs migrate to urban areas28 where they dwell in slums and some are assisted by agencies 
such as the UNHCR. However, as the levels of displaced individuals have increased in recent years, 
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their overwhelming numbers has made it virtually impossible for some governments to cope. The 
government of Iraq is now facing budgeting difficulties as its IDP population has risen to 2.6 million. 
Eighteen of the bottom 20 ranking countries on the UN human development index contain IDPs.  
Only one country, Croatia, out of the 62 with an IDP population is ranked as highly developed, and it 
is worth noting that it is the country with the smallest IDP population of just 2,100 people29 .  The 
lack of development and adherence from some governments make the problem of internal 
displacement not one just of conflict but also a long term problem of poverty and low development. 
While the guiding principles definition of who is a displaced person provides much needed clarity of 
the issue, greater international and national attention is still needed to aid those who have been 
displaced. 
 
5.3 Areas of displacement 
The following section outlines the geographical situation of Internal Displacement. Figure 5.1 shows 
global IDP figures since 1990.  Since 1995 IDP levels have been increasing consistently. 
Figure 5.1: Global IDP Figures 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
29
 Data was taken from the IMDB database for Internal Displacement and compared to the UNDP 
Human Development Index 
58 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 9.7 million of the world’s 26.4 million total IDP population (IDMC, 
2012). The majority of these come from Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, while 
21 African countries contain an IDP population (IDMC, 2012).  Violence between groups for control of 
resources is a major issue within the continent, together with high levels of violence from political, 
ethnic or religious armed groups.  Severe poverty and significant lack of water in certain regions such 
as Somalia have resulted in groups fighting for control over certain areas for economic gain while 
famine and drought have also led to forced migration (Boano and Zetter, 2012).   
Armed conflicts in every country containing an IDP population have been the main source of forced 
migration, and this is especially the case within Africa.  Some are more recent events, such as the 
Côte d'Ivoire uprising in 2003 and fighting following the 2010 elections, caused primary and 
secondary displacement of over a million people (IDMC, 2012).  Long sustained levels of IDPs have 
been seen within Sudan following 50 years of ongoing civil conflict and in Liberia, where the 14 year 
civil war ended in 2003, and yet over 500,000 people remain displaced (IDMC, 2012). 
Severe famine and drought in the horn of Africa has continued to force large groups of people from 
their land spurred on by climate issues, a problem particularly salient in Somalia (Zarocostas, 2011).  
These issues, coupled with ongoing violence between separatist groups, have led Somalia to have an 
IDP population of 1.48 million (IDMG, 2011) 
Americas 
Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Guatemala are the only nations within Latin America who have a 
recorded IDP population.  Both Guatemala and Peru underwent periods of civil conflict, Peru against 
the Maoist guerrilla organisation ‘The Shining Path’ who disbanded in 2001, while Guatemala’s civil 
conflict ended in 1994.  Both nations have been under peaceful administration for over a decade; 
Guatemala for almost two, however, both still retain high levels of internal displacement.  At its peak 
in 1983, Guatemala had 1.5 million IDPs (IDMC, 2011), the majority consisting of rural indigenous 
populations who had come under conflict by government or opposing troops (DigGeorgio-Lutz and 
Hale, 2004).  Likewise in Peru, The Shining Path’s expansion after entering the drug trade to fund its 
agendas allowed it to vastly expand throughout the north of Peru and into urban dwellings (Felbeb-
Brown, 2005).   
Colombia has also been under a state of internal conflict, a situation discussed in great detail in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  It also has suffered from the immense negative effects of the drug trade.  The 
enormous wealth of this trade, which has been the main funding for groups such as the FARC, ELN 
59 
 
and The Shining Path in Peru, is also the main cause of displacement within Mexico.  Mexico 
currently holds 160,000 IDPs (IDMC, 2011), the vast majority of whom have been caught in violence 
from drug cartels (Rios and Shirk, 2011).  The immense value of the cocaine, heroin and 
amphetamine trade within the US has led to billions of dollars being sent through Mexican cartels.  
According to IDMC, drug cartel violence in Mexico caused the death of 15,000 people in 2010, mostly 
in the northern states bordering the US where the majority of trafficking routes are found; these are 
also the areas from which the largest proportion of IDPs originated (IDMC, 2010). 
In 2006, the Mexican government launched an offensive against the country’s drug cartels, and in the 
following years, 31,000 people died in the resulting violence with an additional 230,000 people 
fleeing their homes (IDMC, 2010). Drug cartels are said to control as much as 90% of the state of 
Tamaulipas, which has seen the abandonment of 1,800 state built homes, the closure of 11,000 
businesses and the prolonged school absence of 11,000 students (El País and Felbeb-Brown, 2009).  
Although the total number of people who have fled their homes is estimated to be 230,000, of this 
number, 123,000 are estimated to have fled to the US, of which only 192 have been granted asylum 
(El País and Felbeb-Brown, 2009). Similarly, in Guatemala 350,000–400,000 people have fled to 
neighbouring countries, mostly the US and Mexico, due to the civil conflict (Stepputat, 1999). 
Northern Africa and the Middle East 
Algeria, Syria, Libya, Israel and Iraq all contain IDP populations.  The outbreak of the so-called ‘Arab 
Spring’ resulted in widespread displacement within Syria and Libya, who hold 589,000 and 154,000 
IDPs, respectively (IDMC GO, 2011), while the conflict in Iraq has caused the displacement of 
between 2.3–2.6 million people (IDMC GO, 2011).  The social consequences and large scale poverty 
that have resulted are severe, and access to public services is minimal (Martin and Webber, 2011) 
with health care either out of reach or unaffordable for majority of the IDPs in Syria, Jordan and Iraq 
(Siros et al., 2012). 
The war in Iraq has led to millions of Iraqis either fleeing over international borders or being forced 
to relocate within Iraq (Bigio and Scott, 2009). The Iraqi government is struggling to cope with the 
huge demands arising from the world’s third largest IDP population, as its own economic resources 
are being eroded even further by the decrease in world oil prices, a major revenue source for the 
conflict-stricken nation. 
The fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, although liberating Libya from a government that deprived 
ethnic minorities of basic human rights through policies such as the withdrawal of citizenship rights 
and also sought to expel the Toubou along with other minorities (UN Human Rights Council, p. 7), 
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[the fall of the regime caused huge amounts of destruction and ethnic tension in a country already 
severely under-developed (Martin and Weber, 2011).  As a result, the country now has an IDP 
population of 154,000 people.  While ethnic tensions are still present and the country lacks 
development and public service, the growing strain created by the needs of the IDP population will 
continue to weigh on a government that may not be able to support it. 
In 2011, Syria was estimated to hold 589,000 IDPs (IDMC, 2011), now due to the on-going conflict 
between rebel forces and the Al Assad government the number of IDP’s is estimated by the UN to 
comprise as many as 1.5 million people. According to a report published by the UNHCR on 9 August 
2012, the severe increase in IDPs has resulted from ‘intense fighting and use of heavy weaponry in 
densely populated areas’, with IDPs having little access to food, shelter and healthcare.  
 
South and East Asia 
Majority of displacements within South East Asia or South Asia have resulted from internal conflict 
between political or religious groups. A major issue in Asia, unlike in Europe, Africa or Latin America, 
is that governments do not see the need for guiding principles or international involvement in their 
internal issues even when their own governing organisations fail to provide the required assistance 
to IDPs (Cohen, 2010). 
As Cabellero-Anthony (2011) states, Asia has experienced the highest number of one-sided violence 
campaigns, defined as the intentional use of armed force against civilians from a government or 
formally organised group that results in at least 25 deaths in a calendar year (Stepanova, 2009).  Of 
the 4.3 million people displaced due to the armed conflict in 2011, the majority originated from 
Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
Cambodia. 
In Indonesia, fighting has occurred between Christians and Muslims as well as rebels from the Free 
Papua movement (Organisasi Papua Merkeka) (IDMC, 2011). In Myanmar conflict between 
government forces and ethnic armed groups has caused the majority of the 450,000 IDPs within its 
borders (IDMC GO, 2011). Conflicts in Afghanistan between coalition forces and the Taliban continue, 
leaving at least 450,000 people internally displaced (IDMC, 2011). In Bangladesh, 20 years of armed 
conflict within the Chittagong Hill Tracts has caused 600,000 people to be displaced (Uddin, 2010). 
There are several conflict zones within India caused by ethnic communal violence in Jammu and 
Kashmir (Duschinski and Hoffman, 2011).  Conflict between insurgent groups and government forces 
in Pakistan caused a peak number of displaced persons in 2009, when the total reached 3 million. 
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Internal conflict within the Philippines over the past 30 years caused IDP figures to reach 600,000 in 
2008, while Sri Lanka still holds 125,000 displaced individuals after the 2009 defeat of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by government forces (IDMC, 2011). 
Europe 
Majority of the displacement in Europe has occurred in eastern provinces and former Soviet states.  
Former Yugoslavian states such as Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina still hold 
348,000 IDPs cumulatively, while Georgia, the Russian Federation and Armenia hold IDP populations 
of less than 10,000 whilst Turkey and Cyprus hold 1.2 million and 208,000, respectively (IDMC, 2011). 
The long-lasting social effects of the former Yugoslavian wars have resulted in long-term 
displacement for a number of people, with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia holding substantial 
populations of IDPs.  Ethnic marginalisation and lack of economic opportunity or government support 
have perpetuated these social consequences within the region, with some individuals now being 
born into IDP family groups, further perpetuating the economic consequences and lack of 
opportunity for such individuals. 
The Turkish government has burned down villages suspected of being bases for the PKK (Parti 
Karkerani Kurdistan) militias (IDMC, 2011). Simultaneously, PKK attacks on the civilian population 
(Mutlu, 2011) have led to the huge level of displacement, many of whom do not have a home to 
which they can return. Although official estimates of IDPs are 1.2 million as published by IDMC, other 
estimates have offered figures as high as 3 million (Calislar et al., 2008).  The direct and indirect costs 
of the conflict, which started in 1984, are countless; however, total government expenditure to the 
year 2005 was estimated to be around USD 52.5 billion (Mutlu, 2011). 
 
5.4 Economic environment and consequences facing the internally displaced 
All countries holding IDP populations have encountered some form of conflict, whether civil war, 
ethnic marginalisation and discrimination, or international war, and the resulting effect of 
infrastructure destruction, economic disruption and human capital waste combine to make both 
current economic conditions and any possible economic future extremely bleak for IDPS.  Conflict 
and violence supress economic activity.  Individuals fleeing rural areas into cities often suffer further 
economic hardships as they face segregation, low employment opportunities, squalor in urban slums 
and low access to education and healthcare (Crisp, Morris and Refstie, 2012).  The lack of 
government support for IDPs and the general impoverished communities and countries in which IDPs 
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are found means that the social consequences and economic hardships found by such individuals 
persist long after their initial displacement.  Millions never return to their department of origin; 
thousands of children are born into displacement, leading to future economic consequences for 
displaced generations. Those born into displacement lack basic education, health care and training to 
develop labour skills, causing a decrease of capital labour accumulation and as a result, decreasing 
future economic potential.  Decreases in production will also lead to scarcity of goods, pushing up 
market prices in areas where income is almost impossible to find (Verpoorten, 2009; Bundervoet, 
2006). 
The 62 countries having IDP populations, the majority of which are underdeveloped, hold record 
levels of poverty and inequality (Martin and Weber, 2011; Justino, 2012) and 73% of those ranking in 
the bottom billion of people globally have been through civil conflict (Forster, 2012).  The economic 
costs of conflict also deter significant amounts of economic development from entering a country 
through factors such as decreases in tourism, FDI, productivity and population as well as damages to 
infrastructure and the opportunity cost of expenditure placed within the war effort. Turkey alone 
spent USD 52.5 billion on military expenditure between 1984 and 2005, while the loss of rural output 
was estimated to be USD 16.5 billion (Mutlu, 2011).  If the opportunity cost of the total military 
expenditure and subsequent rebuilding is considered, the carry-on effects and loss of output from 
this capital not being reinvested within local economies are also major issues preventing the 
development of impoverished nations.  The sizeable effect of this dynamic can be observed when 
looking at the arms trade itself, which accounted for USD 800 billion worldwide.  In 1996, world 
average military expenditure was USD 31,380 per soldier, while educational expenditure sat at just 
USD 899 per student and health at USD 231 per capita (Sivard, 1996).  Economics and Peace, an 
international organisation that studies the effects of violence and conflict on economic growth and 
development, estimated that in 2007 alone, conflict decreased gross world product by USD 7.2 
trillion (Brauer and Marlin, 2009).   
There is evidence that once peace is achieved, growth quickly returns to a region. This was seen 
following the Second World War in both Germany and Japan (Brakman et al., 2004; Davis and 
Weinstein, 2002).  While this may have been the case for certain conflicts, the majority of internal 
conflicts have been ongoing for more than a decade, and most regions of war have experienced strife 
following brief periods of peace’. As a result, these countries’ ability to repair and increase foreign 
investment and capital are limited, causing decreased living conditions for years following conflict 
(Justino, 2012).  It has even been suggested that foreign investment in the form of mining 
contributed to increases in internal displacement.  Terminski (2011) finds that oil and mining 
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exploration can lead to violent clashes between the state and entire villages, as forced evictions as 
well as huge amounts of environmental degradation lead to groups having to leave areas.  
High unemployment, decreased educational attainment, decreased access to public healthcare and 
health deformities due to malnutrition are factors evident in every region containing IDPs.  In post 
war Guatemala, the average schooling rate for Mayan school boys was 23% lower and 30% lower for 
school girls when compared to pre-war levels (Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2008).  This has also been 
seen in Rwanda, where children exposed to the civil conflict experienced an 18% decline in their 
education (Arkest and Walque, 2008).  The result of poor levels of educational attainment severely 
impact individuals’ future financial and social abilities (Baum and Ma, 2007).  
In addition to lack of government support, lack of access to health resources has a major effect on 
IDPs (Crisp, Morris and Refstie, 2012).  In Zimbabwe, war-related malnutrition has led to decreases in 
weight and height, which affect manual labour productivity (Alderman et al., 2007) and a similar 
situation was seen in Rwanda (Arkesh et al., 2009).  A study conducted in 2008 and 2009 amongst 
Iraqi displaced populations in Jordan and Syria found that healthcare was unaffordable to the 
majority of those sampled, which included 2013 households, with disability rates due to conflict 
amongst those interviewed at 7.1% and 3.4% in Jordan and Syria, respectively (Doocy et al., 2012).  
Psychological effects such as posttraumatic stress disorder are common amongst IDP populations 
(Forster and Forster, 2012). Specific examples of the psychological effects of war, rape and violence 
have been studied in Sudan and the Congo (Meffert and Marmar, 2009).  Health defects such as 
disabilities gained from being present in conflict zones, whether mental or physical, further 
compound the issue.   
The transferability of employment skills from the department of origin to that of asylum is extremely 
low, making it virtually impossible for IDPs to engage in any reasonable form of sustainable labour 
(Crisp, Morris and Refstie, 2012).  In Bosnia, unemployment among IDPs has been estimated at 
around 95% of the population (UNHCR, 2003).  This is in part due to the mass urbanisation of IDPs, as 
their rural-based skills have no outlet in urban employment markets.  More than 90% of those 
displaced in urban areas in Afghanistan are from rural areas, the majority of whom have been 
displaced for more than 6 years (IDMC, 2012).  Often those who are able to find work within an 
agricultural framework in other rural areas are faced with poor machinery, poor soil and limited 
market access and as a result, they are only able to supply food for themselves or immediate family 
groups without room for an agricultural income (IDMC, 2010).   
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Some IDP groups are also subject to racial or religious discrimination, making employment hard to 
find at their point of asylum or when they return to their point of origin, such as Croat-Serbs 
returning to Croatia after the war.  This is seen in Iraq too; a third of Sunni IDPs feel unsafe in their 
area of displacement due to ongoing sectarian violence in the region (Biggio and Scott, 2009).  A 
report published by the IDMC on 6 May 2010 states, ‘unequal access to services and socio-economic 
disadvantages experienced by Roma put quality education out of their reach, diminishing the 
chances of entering labour market and social integration’. Such encounters of segregation are prime 
examples of how widespread ethnic and religious discrimination can be for IDP populations. This is, 
of course, not always the case. In Somalia for example, a large number of impoverished communities 
have helped the settlement of large numbers of displaced people.  The Sufi brotherhood, who try to 
link people of different clans and origins, have been a major contributor to this cause, helping ease 
the effect of relocation (Lindsay and Catrina, 2011).  
Widespread poverty and under development further limit the ability of IDPs to gain access to the 
economic resources they need and limit the government’s ability to provide adequate support for 
their own IDP populations.  In Afghanistan, two-thirds of the IDPs have no access to water or 
sanitation facilities, (OCHA, 2011 p. 11).  In Georgia, IDP collective centres often do not meet 
minimum standards set by the guiding principles of displacement (IDMC, 2012).  In some cases, 
government forces have even been the ones driving displacement. Examples include Turkey’s policy 
of burning villages suspected of being PKK bases, Colombian military groups tied with paramilitary 
organisations and in Afghanistan, local police are increasingly recognised as a major driver of 
displacement in many rural areas (IDMC, 16 April 2012, p. 4).  Countries such as Afghanistan, whose 
government depends on foreign support and investment for 85% of its revenues, and Iraq, whose 
volatile economy is dependent on currently falling global oil prices, are unable to meet the demands 
of their extremely large IDP populations  
 
The infrastructure consequences of war zones and capital flight make returning to some departments 
of origin impossible.  Houses and villages were bombed in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, areas that also experienced the widespread use of land mines.  A survey conducted by 
the UNHCR within the former Yugoslavian region found that 82% of those interviewed had their pre-
war properties destroyed, with 75% stating that they had nowhere to return (Kett, 2009).  This has 
also been the case in Afghanistan, where the prevalence of mines, improvised explosive devices and 
remnants of war have restricted IDPs’ ability to return to their area of origin (IDMC, 2012).  This was 
also seen in Croatia, where returnees often cannot regain their income from agricultural work due to 
the large number of land mines placed during the Serb-Croatian war (IDMC, 2012).  In Lower Kurram, 
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Pakistan, the destruction of property and infrastructure has been widespread.  The destruction of 60 
villages and 7000 homes in addition to damage to 95 places of worship have caused the 
displacement of 50,000 people who have no homes to which they can return (IDMC, 2012).   
Looting and destruction of personal assets and equipment also severely affects the productive 
capacity of displaced household groups (Justino and Verwimp, 2006).  
IDPs who have been fortunate enough to be able to return to their department of origin have in 
some cases found their properties in the hands of other parties.  In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, new 
practices have come to light that allowed much of IDPs’ land to be sold to new migrants.  Although 
against statutory law, this policy aimed at increasing investment and agricultural output in the 
western forest area to increase the value of export markets (IDMC whose land is this? October 2009).  
Land rights disputes also remain a major issue in Bangladesh, where in some places, 79% of IDPs did 
not return to their place of origin because their land was occupied by settlers (IDMC, Bangladesh 30 
December 2011).  The destruction of property and capital equipment makes the economic rationale 
for returning to the place of origin almost void. As a result, workers often find themselves in areas 
where their skills are redundant, such as rural workers living in urban environments. 
As a result, the severe economic consequences of being an IDP go much further than the act of 
displacement.  While economic goals may quickly improve in some areas, other effects facing these 
populations are more severe and long lasting.  Long-term unemployment, low education attainment, 
the inability to transfer human capital or skilled labour to new departments of refuge, the 
destruction of property or equipment and health defects due to malnutrition, as well as mental 
health issues associated with being displaced, all negatively affect IDP populations’ long term ability 
to recover from displacement and increase their economic standing.  Simultaneously, social effects 
such as racial or religious segregation further impede their ability to integrate into society. The 
problem of inadequate support from local governments needs a more credible solution. With a total 
world IDP population of 26.4 million, more than double that of refugees(IDMC, 2012) and 
circumstances where individuals have been displaced for a second or third occasion, signals the 
drastic need for more support and international intervention to help solve the current IDP problem 
and increase the prospects of their future economic growth and labour capital accumulation. 
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Chapter 6: Global Displacement: Empirical Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the extent to which economic factors, other than conflict and violence, may 
have on increasing internal displacement.  As a result, the findings aim to provide a greater 
understanding of the issues governments and non-government agencies need to address to more 
effectively handle the IDP issue. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the economic consequences faced by displaced populations 
drastically limit their ability to regain their pre-war or pre-conflict economic situation.  Long term 
unemployment, low education attainment, low growth of human capital or skilled labour, the 
destruction of property or equipment and a lack of government support, all have a negative effect on 
the population’s long term ability to economically recover: millions do not return to their department 
of origin and thousands of children are born into displacement.  IDPs’ future economic opportunities 
are severely decreased, with a decrease in labour capital accumulation, low levels of education 
attainment and health defects being the primary sources, as the many examples given in the 
previous chapter have demonstrated 
By looking at a range of economic indicators and IDPs statistics published by the IDMC, this section 
provides added insight into some of the economic factors contributing to increased levels of internal 
displacement over the past decade.  As addressed in the previous chapter, issues of health, 
education and income expand the length of internal displacement and contribute to the drastic 
inequality experienced by IDPs. 
Economies in a macroeconomic sense quickly repair themselves after a conflict has stopped 
(Brakman et al., 2004; Davis and Weinstein, 2002); however, some microeconomic indicators and 
sectors appear to experience long sustained effects such as health defects (Alderman et al., 2007; 
Arkesh et al., 2009) and lower educational standards.  As microeconomic factors such as 
employment, health, education and access to water severely affect the populations of countries 
within conflict, their relationship to displacement needs analysis. 
This chapter examines the social and economic situations facing IDPs to gain a greater understanding 
of the limitations they face as well as the areas on which governments need to focus on so as to 
decrease the length of displacement and accurately address the major economic factors associated 
with internal displacement. 
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6.2 Data  
The data used will cover a selection of 62 countries that experienced internal displacement over the 
time period of 2000−2011.  The country data on internal displacement levels was collected by the 
IDMC and is used by the World Bank.  There are two versions of the statistics, a lower and a higher 
estimate.  In this particular analysis, the higher estimate will be used as the level of recorded 
displacement is most likely a great under-estimation of actual IDP levels (IDMC, 2012).  
Trade indicators and foreign investment will also be examined.  Trade and FDI as a percent each of 
GDP will be used.  One can assume that if trade decreases so may GDP; in places of conflict or post 
conflict, decreased levels of trade will be expected to have a negative impact on internal 
displacement numbers and vice versa due to increases or decreases of economic activity. 
Other production variables will include value added agricultural production, trade as a percent of 
GDP and the labour force participation rate.  Value added agriculture as a percent of GDP includes 
the cultivation of crops as well as all hunting, forestry, fishing and livestock production.  Value added 
is calculated by subtracting intermediate inputs from the net output.  The data is published as part of 
the World Bank’s national accounts dataset. As a large proportion of IDPs come from rural areas, one 
would expect decreases in rural work to be associated with increased IDP populations. 
To measure conflict levels, government military expenditure will be utilised.  As previously 
mentioned, increased conflict levels correlate with increased government expenditure on the 
military, which not only fuels the war effort but also diverts public funds from other programmes.  As 
a result, the effect this starving of other programmes may have on the level of internal displacement 
needs to be determined.  The data for military expenditure as a percent of GDP is published by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and includes all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forces. 
A range of investment indicators will be used to assess the link between the IDPs and development 
of capital and investment within a country.  These will be Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Gross Fixed Capital Formation.  Net ODA per capita is a measure 
of the recipient country’s dependency on aid and is published by the Organisation of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).  The data includes all loans and grants from DAC (Development 
Assistance Committee)30 and non-DAC countries and multilateral organisations.   ODA has been 
shown to be more closely related to development than other investment variables such as FDI.  Data 
                                                          
30
 The Development Assistance Committee is a forum of OECD member states to discuss issues 
surrounding aid, development and poverty currently there are 26 member states. 
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for FDI is taken from the International Monetary Fund’s international financial statistics and balance 
of payments database.  FDI represents the net inflows of investment in an enterprise operating in an 
economy.  Gross Fixed capital formation as a percent of GDP is published by the World Bank’s 
national accounts databank.  It includes all improvements and developments of capital for example, 
schools, offices and hospitals as well as machinery, fences, drains and waterways.   
To assess the effect of human capital accumulation, the model will use primary and secondary 
education duration.  There have been case studies on the effect of post conflict education in 
Guatemala and Rwanda (Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2008; Arkest and Walque, 2008) showing lower 
education levels post-conflict in the above countries.  Primary and secondary education represents 
the number of full time years of education in the respective countries schooling system.  This data is 
published by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO) institute for 
statistics.  Using these two levels this analysis examines the effect education has in relation to 
displacement on a global level.  If decreased education duration is observed then this may support 
the argument that those who are displaced suffer the effect of lower education and as a result, 
decreased human capital accumulation. Alternatively, this may also indicate that countries having 
low levels of development or government infrastructure also suffer higher levels of internal 
displacement.  As health also affects human capital, government expenditure per capita on health is 
also included in the model.  Health expenditure per capita is published by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and is represented in current USD.  It represents the sum of public and private 
health expenditure as a ratio of the total population.  
As employment opportunities are limited for IDPs, the participation rate will be used as it was in the 
previous study in Chapter 4 on Colombian displacement.  An increased participation rate may reveal 
if populations are able to find new levels of employment in their area of settlement. 
 
Summary Statistics 
The internal displacement data shows large deviations between countries, with a mean of 561,538, a 
maximum value of 6.1 million and a minimum value of just 650. This conveys how diverse the issue of 
internal displacement is depending on the country of context.  Countries such as Macedonia who 
only recorded 650 internally displaced people in 2010 face differing strains when compared to 
countries such as Colombia who hold 6.1m IDPs in the same time period. 
Military expenditure as a percent of GDP not surprisingly shows a mean level of 2.67% however a 
maximum of 24.23%.  As many of the countries included in this study are fragile states, generally 
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with low levels of GDP and consistently high levels of political violence, the high level of expenditure 
can be understood. 
Primary and secondary education levels, while not high by levels in the developed world are 
reasonable.  Mean levels of 5.3 and 6.5 years respectfully show that most populations do have access 
to education on average.  However, with minimum levels of 3 and 4 years respectfully, it also shows 
that some countries are drastically missing out, recording levels less than half of the maximum 
recorded values of 7 and 8 years in this sample. 
Health expenditure per capita shows extremely low results, with a minimum recorded level of $10.52 
USD per capita.  The low levels are a reflection of the lack of access to basic necessities which may be 
required in countries experiencing drastic poverty or are in a state of conflict. 
Net ODA per capita shows a mean level of $44.4 USD.  Low levels of ODA per capita are not 
uncommon, however do show the reality of how little aid or assistance is reaching countries in need.  
Furthermore as ODA includes debt clearance within its calculations, the amount of funding reaching 
populations in distress is most likely much lower. 
The economic statistics of value added agriculture production, trade and labour participation also 
show large deviations.  The issue with such large deviations when conducting a global study means 
that the diverse range of countries included and the diverse economies within the study means that 
some of these economic issues facing some countries may not be present in others and as a result 
may not be present in the results given that there are 309 observations in this study.  However, this 
is a global study and not a country specific analysis, the model wishes to see if there are any common 
relationships throughout nations containing internally displaced populations, this does not mean that 
the results show a specific relationship which applies to all countries within the model. 
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Table 6.1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Internal Dispalcement 309 561538.9 982153.5 650 6100000
Millitary Expenditure 309 2.67 2.42 0.38 24.23
Per cent of GDP
Labour Participation Rate 309 50.24 19.21 12.1 86.4
Health Expenditure 309 274.31 324.6 10.52 1580.92
Per Capita USD
FDI Per Cent of GDP 309 3.95 5.73 -14.37 45.15
Primary Education Duration 309 5.3 0.94 3 7
Secondary Education Duration 309 6.55 0.98 4 8
Net ODA Per Capita 309 44.4 50.107 -8.8 324.58
Fixed Capital Formation 309 2.74E+10 6.71E+10 1.96E+07 5.12E+11
Trade Percent of GDP 309 67.82 27.77 22.35 156.86
Agg Value 309 19.42 12.96 3.64 58.72
Percent of GDP  
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Table 6.2 Global Internal Displacement according to Countries 2000−2010 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Afghanistan 1000000 920000 600000 200000 200000 132000 161000 235000 297000 352000
Algeria 200000 200000 200000 1000000 1000000
Angola 3000000 3500000 900000 340000 61700 61700 20000
Armenia 60000 50000 50000 3000 8000 8400 8400 8400 8400 8000
Azerbaijan 570000 572000 570000 575000 558387 687000 690000 603000 586000 593000
Bangladesh 500000 260000 520000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000 500000
Bosnia and Herzegovina 518000 388000 333850 313000 183400 180000 132000 125000 114000 113400
Burundi 633000 487500 525000 170000 117000 100000 100000 100000 100000 100000
C.A.R. 150000 197000 108000 162000 192000
Chad 179000 180000 168000 171000
Colombia 2200000 2800000 2900000 3300000 3700000 3800000 4000000 4400000 4900000 5200000
Congo Dem Rep 2000000 2300000 3000000 2300000 1700000 1100000 1400000 1400000 1900000 1700000
Congo Rep 150000 75000 84000 100000 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800
Cote d'ivor 200000 600000 500000 500000 750000 709000 621000
Croatia 31000 19500 13995 10355 4900 7000 3200 2600 2400 2300
Cyprus 265000 210000 210000 210000 210000 210000 201000 201000 208000
Eritria 53000 58180 58000 59000 50509 45000 32000 10000 10000
Ethiopia 50000 12500 169000 132000 265000 280000 200000 300000 350000 300000
Georgia 272101 257000 260000 260000 240000 241000 247000 279000 230000 258000
Guatemala 250000 250000 250000 242000 242000 242000
Guinea 359000 82000 100000 82000 82000 19000
Guinea Bissau 2000 1000
India 507000 650000 650000 600000 600000 600000 600000 500000 500000 650000
Indonesia 1300000 1100000 600000 500000 600000 250000 200000 120000 120000 200000
Iraq 700000 1000000 1100000 1000000 1300000 1700000 2500000 2800000 2800000 2800000
Israel 200000 200000 300000 300000 420000 420000 200000
Kenya 100000 200000 350000 360000 381924 431000 200000 600000 250000
Kosovo 20000 19700 18300
Lebanon 350000 300000 300000 500000 600000 800000 390000 390000 390000
Liberia 100000 180000 500000 450000 48000 28000
Macedonia 16350 3154 1829 770 726 790 770 650 650
Mexico 16000 10000 12000 12000 12000 12000 5500 21000 8000 120000
Moldova 1000 1000
Mayanma 1000000 733000 1000000 526000 540000 500000 500000 451000 470000 446000
Nepal 200000 150000 200000 200000 70000 70000 70000 50000
Nigeria 550000 30000 100000 200000 20000
Pakistan 3000 45000 45000 30000 20000 480000 1200000 980000
Peru 60000 60000 60000 60000 60000 150000 150000 150000 150000
Philippines 150000 45000 150000 60000 60000 120000 300000 308000 188000
Russian Federation 500000 380000 366000 360000 265000 190000 159000 98000 80000 78000
Sanegal 12000 6000 5000 5000 64000 64000 22000 70000 40000 40000
Serbia 275400 248000 247000 228000 247000 226000 230000 225000
Siera Leone 1300000 10000 7500
Solomon Islands 30000 30000 3500
Somalia 350000 350000 350000 400000 400000 400000 1000000 1300000 1500000 1500000
Sri Lanka 800000 800000 613000 362000 341175 500000 460000 485000 400000 327000
Sudan 4000000 4000000 4000000 6100000 5400000 5400000 5800000 4900000 4900000 5200000
Syrian Arab Republic 153000 300000 500000 305000 305000 305000 430000 433000 433000 433000
Timor Leste 100000 100000 30000 400
Togo 1500 1500
Turkey 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000 1200000 1200000 1200000 1200000 1200000
Uganda 584000 650000 1200000 1600000 1700000 1700000 1300000 869000 437000 166000
Uzbekistan 3000 3500 3500 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400
Yemen 35000 23000 175000 250000
Zimbabwe 150000 200000 150000 569685 570000 570000 1000000 1000000 1000000
Source: World Bank Databank
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6.3 Methodology  
As in Chapter 3 the econometric models are set up as follows: 
Our initial OLS equation: 
              
    = the Dependant Variable (DV) 
    = Independent Variables (IV) 
  = coefficient for the independent variable 
               
 while the fixed effects equation is determined by 
                      (4.2) 
   = (I = 1...n) unknown intercept of each entity 
     =the Dependant Variable (DV) 
    = Independent Variables (IV) 
    = coefficient for the independent variable 
    = error term 
 
Our fixed effect equation a year dummy variable becomes 
                                                     
    = Dependant Variable (DV) 
      = Independent Variables (IV) 
   = Coefficient of the independent variables 
    = error term 
   = the entity n. 
73 
 
   = coefficient for the binary regressors 
   = time as a binary variable  
   is the coefficient of the binary time repressors  
 
6.4 Results 
 
The results Table 6.3 show significant correlations between education, economic growth, military 
expenditure and internal displacement figures.  The fixed effects models lack significance, however, 
this is not surprising as by including country fixed effects the only way any information can be 
conveyed is by within country variation in X across time.  As there are only 11 years of data and most 
independent variables are quite stable, it is difficult for the model to pick up any within country 
variation effect here which is conveyed in the results.  The significant relationships in both OLS 
models offer enough evidence to support Chamarbagwala and Moran (2008) and Arkest and Walque 
(2008) that there is a negative effect on education attainment and internal displacement.  The results 
in the OLS models used in this thesis show a negative relationship between duration of both primary 
[Table 6.3 (-153,153**, -282,829**, -317,187**)] and secondary [Table 6.3 (1233.657***, -86,095, -
133,090)] education and global IDP levels.  Primary education is the only variable in the set to show a 
significant correlation with internal displacement in any of the fixed effect models.  However, the 
results need to be examined in detail as the OLS model also holds s significant problem with omitted 
variable bias which is partly dealt with by the fixed effects estimation.  
Model 1 in table 6.3 shows a negative relationship of -153,145*** between primary education and 
internal displacement levels using OLS regression analysis and -282,829, -317,187**using the two 
fixed effects models similar to chapter 4.  This does not mean that an increase of one year of 
education leads to a decrease in internal displacement by 153,145 people, instead it suggests that 
countries with lower levels of educational attainment have greater incidences of internally displaced 
people. As mentioned above the OLS model holds a significant problem with omitted variable bias.  
This relationship could be due to a number of reasons, such as families may be forced from their area 
of origin, often into new urban areas offering limited access to public services such as education, or 
IDPs having limited ability to enrol their children or themselves as the availability of educational 
institutes may be poor in many makeshift impoverished areas in which displaced individuals reside.  
Alternatively, it may be that countries whose populations have higher levels of education attainment 
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are also countries which can provide higher levels of public investment and infrastructure, which may 
result in an increase in the average levels of primary and secondary education. Therefore, the 
possibilities of endogeniety or unobserved heterogeneity cannot be dismissed and is most likely one 
of the causes of this large correlation.  A time lag was also placed on both primary and secondary 
education attainment levels and although the relationships are consistent with the non-lagged 
variable, they are not as strongly correlated [Table 6.3(9-135,835*, -125,478, -180176)]. 
The two output statistics, Total Labour Participation Rate [Table 6.3 (-12.621**, 14.16, 13.079)] and 
Value Added Agriculture as a percent of GDP [Table 6.3 (-707, -4.322,-11.153)], have negative 
relationships with displacement levels.  The participation rate, however, does show a positive 
relationship in all fixed effect models, albeit ones that are not statistically significant, and as 
mentioned before, the reliability of fixed effects in this particular case is minimal.  One possible 
explanation for this relationship is that the disturbance in production due to conflict often results in 
economic activity losses during periods of conflict, leading to individuals losing their sources of 
income through decreases of production or destruction of public goods and infrastructure.  This can 
also be seen as Fixed Capital Formation and Trade as a percent of GDP, which show a negative 
statistically significant relationships with IDPs in the below OLS models [Table 6.3(-36, 760***)].  As 
mentioned, the OLS model does suffer from issues with unobserved heterogeneity which is partly 
taken care of by the fixed effects estimate.  Although the fixed effects results are not significant, they 
do convey the same relationship as the OLS estimate [Table 6.3(-12, 760, -1.21E+04). 
FDI [Table 6.3(58.573***, 13.843, 14.323)] shows a significant positive correlation with IDP levels 
using the OLS estimate, which still showing a positive correlation when both fixed effects models are 
used. Initially this may appear contradictory as conventionally, one would assume that increased 
levels of foreign investment within a country would be associated with a stable economic climate, a 
characteristic not seen often in countries with increasing levels of internal displacement.  However, 
one possible explanation can be supported by previous academic literature (Feeney, 2000).  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, post-conflict macroeconomic performance is generally quick to 
respond with high levels of investment, government expenditure and trade boosting performance 
(Brakman et al., 2004; Davis and Weinstein, 2002).  However, the limited and isolated areas in which 
IDPs live means that the follow-on effects from such economic achievements may not be transmitted 
through to the entire community; the economic benefits may not reach them.  Other factors that 
may contribute to this are large scale investments in natural resources.  In Colombia, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, large foreign corporations have been accused of cooperating with paramilitary forces, 
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displacing people from land for its economic value.  Although a conclusive causation cannot be 
identified, these factors are possible contributors to the relationship seen in the results. 
ODA, on the other hand, appears to have a negative relationship with IDP levels [Table 6.3(-2673**, -
42, -19)].  Recently, in a report published by the UN looking at ‘Fragile States’, i.e. countries in 
disrupted political climates or state of war, has shown that when compared to and other forms of aid 
or investment such as FDI, ODA showed the most significant impact on growth (UNPBSO, 2012). This 
occurs because aid often flows to post-conflict societies (See Paul Collier the Bottom Billion). 
As violent outbreaks are a primary cause of internal displacement, it is no surprise that there is a 
positive statistically significant link between military expenditure [Table 6.3(38,050*, 48,673, 
40,031)] and IDPs, a finding supported by Mutlu (2011).  The onset of conflict can increase the 
amount of public expenditure directed to military efforts.  This may result in destruction of capital 
and disruption of economic growth, which can be seen from our results above, but also diverts public 
funding from other areas in which it is needed, such as health and education.  
A lack of significance was found for the fixed effect models, which is not surprising as there are only 
11 years of data.  As a result, the within-country variation of the independent variables over time is 
hard to recover due to the stability of the independent variables used31.  Although the fixed effects 
test is useful for dealing with problems of omitted variable bias or unobserved endogeneity, for the 
fixed effect results to be useful in this study, the time period needs to be extended.  However, 
although the fixed effects results are not as significant, they do generally follow the same pattern of 
relationships as the OLS model used within this chapter, which, although doesn’t provide us with 
sound concluding evidence, does suggest that the significant relationships shown in the OLS model 
are more than coincidental. 
                                                          
31
 I would like to thank my examiners for alerting me of this issue. 
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Table 6.3 : OLS Fixed Effect and time dummy with lagged education and employment 
Dependant Variable:  Internally Displaced people
Independent Variables OLS FE FE year OLS lag FE lag FE year lag
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Primary Education -153,153** -282,828** -317,187**
Duration [-1.99] [-2.19] [-2.18]
Secondary Education -233,657*** -86,095 -133,090
Duration [-3.41] [-0.75] [-0.94]
Labour Particpation -12,621** 14,160 13,079
Rate [-2.43] [0.74] [0.68]
Agricultural Value -707 -4,322 -11,153 73 -19 -7,432
Added GDP [-0.13] [-0.26] [-0.48] [0.013] [-0.0012] [-0.31]
Official Development -2,673** -42 -19 -2,708** 131 180
Assistance  Per Capita [-2.30] [-0.042] [-0.019] [-2.29] [0.14] [0.18]
Trade % of GDP -11,958*** 4,348 5,368 -11,759*** 4,928 5,857
[-5.28] [1.45] [1.20] [-5.08] [1.37] [1.11]
FDI  % of GDP 58,573*** 13,843 14,323
[5.58] [0.97] [1.06]
Military Expenditure 38,050* 48,673 40,031 36,986* 62,420 53,842
 % GDP [1.79] [0.89] [0.66] [1.72] [1.04] [0.81]
Fixed Capital -36,760*** -12,225 -1.21E+04 -33,579*** -8,781 -7.98E+03
Formation % GDP [-4.15] [-1.13] [-1.28] [-3.80] [-1.02] [-1.08]
Health Expenditure -99.3 650 7.27E+02 -159 556 6.90E+02
Per Capita [-0.31] [1.07] [1.17] [-0.49] [0.92] [1.11]
Lag Primary -135,835* -125,478 -180,176
Duration [-1.76] [-0.99] [-1.13]
Lag Secondary -233,422*** 39,338 -21,094
Duration [-3.36] [0.35] [-0.15]
Lag labour -14,083*** 20,353 18,899
Participation [-2.66] [0.88] [0.80]
Lag FDI 55,791*** 9.50E+03 9.21E+03
% GDP [5.15] [0.92] [0.92]
Constant 5.11e+06*** 5.04e+06***
[5.92] [5.81]
Observations 309 309 309 307 307 307
R-squared 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.06 0.07
t-statistics in brackets
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
No Lagged Variables Lagged Employment and Education Variables
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a global overview highlighting the economic issues facing those who are 
displaced from their area of origin.  The results in the pooled OLS model showed significant 
relationships with a range of economic variables that affect IDP populations.  As this analysis 
incorporated data from 62 countries with recorded IDP populations over a 10 year period, the fixed 
effect results may not be the best gauge of assessment due to the large pool of countries over a 
short time period with a lack of variation in the values of the independent variables used.  Decreases 
in education, economic activity and employment are all shown in the OLS model, factors which may 
contribute to increased global levels of IDPs, but the possibility that this increase is associated with 
another exogenous variable not included within the model cannot be discounted.  While 
developmental assistance showed a significant negative relationship with IDP populations, FDI 
showed the opposite. 
The results within this chapter are not sufficiently robust to form proper and definite statements so 
as to the links between internal displacement and economic variables; however, some of the 
relationships can be used as indicators of what variables are more closely related to the economic 
problems linked with internal displacement.    
Decreased levels of production, trade, employment and education have been shown to have a 
significant relationship with increased IDP numbers.  Brakman et al. (2004) and Davis and Weinstein 
(2002) show economic growth in post-conflict areas is quick to respond to the end of violence. 
However, in current areas of conflict where civil wars are ongoing and conflicts are often reignited 
after small periods of peace such as sub-Saharan Africa, Colombia and the Middle East.  These 
countries which are now often referred to as ‘fragile states’ have a limited ability to regain their 
economic potential and restore their production to pre-conflict levels.  If these factors are combined 
with increased poverty and decreased human capital, the possibility of a virtual lost generation of 
economic growth is considerable, especially when governments are unable to afford the drastically 
increased social costs associated with increased IDPs or refuse to address the problem.   It must be 
stressed that the results do not show a causal relationship, however, show correlations between 
levels of internal displacement and the list of independent variables. 
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Chapter 7: Final Conclusions and Recommendations 
This thesis has outlined global issues facing those who are internally displaced.  Chapter 2 outlined 
Colombia’s history with coca and the subsequent eradication campaigns, which were widely used 
throughout what was known as ‘Plan Colombia’.  A critical analysis of their effect on Colombia’s 
regional populations and the links that coca and the narcotics trade have with militant organisations 
such as the FARC and AUC was also presented.  Chapter 3 detailed Colombia’s history with insurgent 
groups and the growing levels of violence and forced displacement that they are inflicting on 
Colombia’s former regional and now urban communities.  Chapter 4 followed with an empirical study 
examining the relationship that various economic variables as well as coca cultivation and eradication 
have on Colombia’s IDP population.  The results showed positive links between eradication, 
homicides, coca cultivation and displacement, whilst also showing evidence that economic variables 
such as the labour force participation rate and economic output indicators may also be contributing.  
Chapter 5 examined at the economic situation facing those who are displaced: social segregation and 
lack of education, health and employment coupled with the destruction of property and assets, 
which are all common global economic variables related to increasing levels of internal displacement.  
Chapter 6 followed with an empirical study analysing such variables, and although the Fixed Effect 
models failed to show many significant correlations, our OLS results conveyed links between 
decreased educational enrolment and increased levels of internal displacement levels, increased 
official developmental assistance and decreased internal displacement levels and between increased 
military expenditure and increased internal displacement levels, whilst also showing some surprising 
results such as increased FDI being positively correlated with internal displacement. 
Within Colombia, the results add to the growing evidence of a link between both coca cultivation and 
eradication and increased levels of Colombia’s IDP population.  The lack of government support for 
coca growers mixed with decades of government and state neglect in many of Colombia’s rural 
sectors has led to a dependence on coca as a means of income in some communities, while guerrilla 
forces and paramilitaries have been able to capitalise on coca production to fund their own political 
and military agendas.  One possible reason for the links between coca cultivation and internal 
displacement may be that rural farmers are pushed off their land by militant or guerrilla groups 
seeking to use the area for coca cultivation or militant groups are fighting over areas of coca 
cultivation due to its economic value. Alternatively, increased eradication may deprive local farmers 
from their only means of income as much of Colombia’s regional areas have been neglected by the 
government for almost the entirety of their history. 
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On the global front, more governmental and international action needs to be taken to promote 
factors such as access to education and health, government security, improved infrastructure and the 
rule of law.  Constant rebellions in Africa and lack of regional security in the Americas as well as 
South Asia have contributed to increased levels of internal displacement.  As local (often unstable 
and impoverished) governments lack the capabilities and funding to implement the types of reform 
or infrastructure needed in such areas, the international donor community needs to critically assess 
how aid, investment and increases in economic activity can decrease internal displacement levels, 
whilst also supporting local governments in promoting social necessities such as health and 
education, which are lacking in virtually all countries with IDP populations. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Expelled Persons, Demobilised Paramilitaries, Victims of massacres, Homicides, other agricultural production,
production, total agricultural production, participation rate, aerial eradication, unemployment rate
Expelled Households OLS FE FE i.year OLS FE FE i.year OLS FE FE i.year
Demobilised 18.0* 9.49 -6.14 2.57 4.36 -17.3 16.4* 12.8** -7.01
Paramilirary [1.99] [1.49] [-0.65] [0.31] [0.60] [-1.71] [1.85] [2.20] [-0.57]
Cases of -25 -63.4 -24.4 -63.1 -99 -128** -34.3 -54.7 4.19
Massacres [-0.40] [-1.24] [-0.63] [-0.66] [-1.06] [-2.95] [-0.59] [-1.39] [0.10]
Total 4.81*** 0.32 1.75 7.65*** 0.71 2.86 5.20*** -0.22 0.97
Homicides [2.94] [0.16] [1.06] [3.89] [0.24] [1.70] [3.07] [-0.14] [0.56]
Total Value 0.14 -0.38*** -0.44** 0.18 -0.36** -0.67*** 0.11 -0.48*** -0.53***
 Added Production [1.52] [-3.59] [-2.96] [1.68] [-2.36] [-4.12] [1.15] [-5.51] [-5.16]
Other Agricultural -3.34 1.52 0.78 -5.36** -0.86 -1.86 -2.41 1.81 -0.022
 Production [-1.63] [1.22] [0.46] [-2.19] [-0.67] [-1.04] [-1.15] [1.64] [-0.0094]
Participation -325* -285 291 -478** -357 701
Rate [-1.91] [-1.78] [0.81] [-2.18] [-1.20] [1.64]
Aerial 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.39*** 0.27** 0.21*
Eradication [2.96] [3.92] [3.64] [3.18] [2.84] [2.12]
Unemployment 121 411 782 -149 356 416
Rate [0.36] [1.17] [1.57] [-0.30] [0.70] [0.96]
Lag. Aerial 0.11 0.035 0.074
Eradication [1.33] [0.40] [1.14]
Lag. Participation -198 13.5 349
Rate [-1.04] [0.066] [1.37]
Lag. Unemployment -331 -659** -81
Rate [-1.14] [-2.81] [-0.20]
Constant 23,403** 38,777*** 20,882*
[2.31] [2.92] [1.90]
Observations 45 45 45 41 41 -16.3 45 45 45
R-squared 0.82 0.58 0.79 0.78 0.44 0.82 0.58 0.75
t-statistics in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
No Lagged Variables Lagged Eradication Lagged Employment
 
Table A.2 Expelled Persons, Demobilised Paramilitaries, Victims of massacres, Homicides, other
agricultural production, total agricultural production, participation rate, coca cultivation, unemployment rate 
Expelled Persons OLS FE FE i.year OLS FE FE i.year OLS FE FE i.year
Demobilised Paramilirary -4.01 -1.36 -9.91* -6.32 4.95 -4.99 -6.44 -4.18 -9.14
[-0.52] [-0.27] [-2.03] [-0.80] [1.07] [-1.03] [-0.82] [-0.96] [-1.29]
Cases of Massacres 10.4 -4.03 71.8 -3.4 4.2 72.9 9.13 1.87 79
[0.14] [-0.055] [1.12] [-0.044] [0.061] [1.16] [0.14] [0.027] [1.34]
Total Homicides 7.27*** 0.49 2.31 8.13*** 0.82 2.32 7.85*** 0.17 2.13
[4.08] [0.16] [0.99] [4.47] [0.32] [1.11] [4.12] [0.054] [0.78]
Total Value 0.26*** -0.39** -0.47*** 0.24** -0.44*** -0.52*** 0.25** -0.43** -0.46***
Added Production [2.71] [-2.32] [-3.39] [2.41] [-3.03] [-3.91] [2.44] [-2.75] [-3.25]
Other Agricultural -6.95*** -1.14 -0.42 -7.38*** -1.15 -0.57 -6.35*** -1.47 -0.96
Production [-3.27] [-1.17] [-0.40] [-3.41] [-1.04] [-0.57] [-2.89] [-1.48] [-0.86]
Participation Rate -472** -223 391 -478** -351* 245
[-2.47] [-1.04] [1.70] [-2.46] [-2.09] [1.26]
Coca Cultivation 0.52** -0.064 -0.011 0.51** -0.16 0.06
[2.69] [-0.22] [-0.043] [2.59] [-0.67] [0.17]
Unemployment Rate -16.8 117 -7.36 8.71 261 129
[-0.038] [0.27] [-0.018] [0.018] [0.45] [0.26]
Lag. Coca Cultivation 0.54*** 0.61** 0.43**
[2.74] [2.80] [2.92]
Lag. Participation Rate -312 -40.1 337
[-1.56] [-0.12] [1.03]
Lag. Unemployment Rate -529 -251 -77.4
[-1.46] [-0.75] [-0.26]
Constant 35,023*** 35,475*** 31,378**
[3.00] [2.93] [2.69]
Observations 52 52 52 50 50 50 52 52 52
R-squared 0.72 0.29 0.62 0.73 0.38 0.66 0.71 0.28 0.61
No Lagged Variables Lagged Coca Lagged Employment
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Table A.3 Expelled Households, Demobilised Paramilitaries, Victims of massacres, Homicides, other agricultural production
agricultural production, total agricultural production, participation rate, aerial eradication, unemployment rate 
Expelled Households OLS FE FE i.year OLS FE FE i.year OLS FE FE i.year
Demobilised 4.05** 4.14** 0.16 -3.74 3.06 -2.42 3.69* 4.98*** 0.22
Paramilirary [2.06] [2.66] [0.094] [-1.47] [1.53] [-1.24] [1.87] [3.64] [0.081]
Cases of Massacres 9.08 -17.4 -10.6 15.5 -26.1 -41.9** 6.48 -13.7 -2.55
[0.81] [-1.64] [-1.09] [0.49] [-1.23] [-2.61] [0.59] [-1.69] [-0.26]
Total Homicides 1.29*** 0.35 0.59 3.07*** 0.39 0.82** 1.40*** 0.19 0.4
[3.83] [0.89] [1.71] [5.32] [0.60] [2.51] [3.94] [0.65] [1.16]
Total Value 0.046** -0.042** -0.083** 0.054 -0.033 -0.14*** 0.037 -0.078*** -0.11***
Added Production [2.13] [-2.26] [-2.57] [1.50] [-1.10] [-3.50] [1.61] [-4.60] [-4.21]
Other Agricultural -0.98** 0.56** 0.39 -2.03** 0.0016 -0.29 -0.75 0.67** 0.21
 Production [-2.16] [2.65] [1.25] [-2.51] [0.0070] [-0.76] [-1.60] [2.80] [0.42]
Participation Rate -95.1** -91.6** 81.7 -125 -102 172*
[-2.41] [-2.60] [0.95] [-1.68] [-1.46] [1.83]
Aerial Eradication 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.050*** 0.089*** 0.062** 0.048*
[2.86] [4.20] [3.51] [3.06] [2.56] [1.90]
Unemployment Rate 7.66 146* 219* -118 133 131
[0.099] [1.82] [1.80] [-0.70] [1.11] [1.38]
Lag. Aerial 0.024 -0.00059 0.013
 Eradication [0.89] [-0.028] [0.80]
Lag. Participation -66 -24.5 79.4
Rate [-1.47] [-0.58] [1.14]
Lag. Unemployment -93.9 -176*** -43.4
 Rate [-1.35] [-3.62] [-0.53]
Constant 6,608*** 10,519** 6,027**
[2.86] [2.33] [2.34]
Observations 46 46 46 42 42 42 46 46 46
R-squared 0.84 0.55 0.76 0.75 0.4 0.76 0.84 0.51 0.69
No Lagged Variables Lagged Eradication Lagged Employment
 
Table A.4 Table 2 Expelled Households, Demobilised Paramilitaries, Victims of massacres, Homicides, other
agricultural production, total agricultural production, participation rate, coca cultivation, unemployment rate 
Expelled Households OLS FE FE i.year OLS FE FE i.year OLS FE FE i.year
Demobilised -2.45 6.25 5.89 -2.74 6.14* 5.07 -2.62 5.35 3.2
 Paramilirary [-0.66] [1.43] [1.10] [-0.72] [1.79] [1.24] [-0.72] [1.27] [0.63]
Cases of -5.92 -27.5** -13.8 -11 -29.0** -17.5 -9.84 -34.6* -16.8
Massacres [-0.20] [-2.32] [-1.00] [-0.36] [-2.19] [-1.24] [-0.36] [-2.00] [-1.05]
Total 2.91*** 0.063 -0.15 3.00*** -0.037 -0.37 2.91*** -0.36 -0.61
Homicides [4.00] [0.092] [-0.11] [4.02] [-0.047] [-0.26] [3.91] [-0.40] [-0.41]
Total Value 0.11** -0.067 -0.039 0.10* -0.08 -0.049 0.11** -0.078 -0.097
Added Production [2.06] [-1.06] [-0.33] [1.99] [-1.25] [-0.39] [2.05] [-1.05] [-0.79]
Other Agricultural -2.75** -0.0045 1.4 -2.91** -0.09 1.29 -2.73** -0.17 0.92
 Production [-2.45] [-0.0072] [1.08] [-2.54] [-0.15] [1.02] [-2.44] [-0.29] [0.89]
Participation -42.7 -134 -12.2 -36.4 -137 -26.2
 Rate [-0.43] [-1.27] [-0.11] [-0.36] [-1.65] [-0.20]
Coca 0.034 0.072 0.12 0.025 0.019 0.11
 Cultivation [0.33] [0.74] [0.85] [0.24] [0.24] [0.78]
Unemployment -131 -35 -62.1 -138 -23 -29.6
 Rate [-0.59] [-0.19] [-0.28] [-0.56] [-0.11] [-0.13]
Lag. Coca 0.018 0.076 0.048
 Cultivation [0.17] [0.78] [0.26]
Lag. Participation 48.8 20.5 239
Rate [0.48] [0.25] [1.35]
Lag. Unemployment -245 -34.6 -79.6
 Rate [-1.33] [-0.23] [-0.33]
Constant 5,869 5,872 1,895
[0.99] [0.96] [0.32]
Observations 59 59 59 57 57 57 59 59 59
R-squared 0.63 0.12 0.26 0.64 0.12 0.26 0.65 0.1 0.28
t-statistics in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
No Lagged Variables Lag Cultivation Lag Employment
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Tables A1 to A4 in the Appendix contain a larger array of variables than Chapter 4.  Within this group 
was ‘cases of massacres’ and ‘demobilised paramilitary’ from data published by Colombia’s noche y 
niebla statistical database within Red Banco de datos.  As these data are limited to the time period 
2003−2006, the dataset itself is limited to 43 observations.  The results show inconclusive 
correlations between the independent variables and household and individual displacement as 
dependant variables; as a result they were not included in the final tables.   
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